An Inquest taken on behalf of our Sovereign Lady the Queen at Adelaide in the State of South Australia, on the 6th-30th days of April, 3rd-7th days of May, 31st day of May-18th day of June, 28th-30th days of June, 1st-29th days of July, 10th-13th days of August, and 17th day of September, 1999, before Wayne Cromwell Chivell, a Coroner for the said State, concerning the death of Geoffrey Leigh Bowen.

1. Introduction

1.1 At about 9.15a.m. on Wednesday 2 March 1994 an explosion occurred at the offices of the National Crime Authority ("NCA") situated in the CPS Credit Union Building, Waymouth Street, Adelaide. The explosion caused the death of Detective Sergeant Geoffrey Leigh Bowen, serious injuries to Mr. Peter John Wallis, a lawyer employed by the NCA, and extensive property damage to the building.

 

1.2 It became quickly apparent following the explosion that it had been the result of a bomb which had been collected from the General Post Office by NCA security staff that morning. As such, the explosion was clearly the result of a premeditated act on the part of some person or persons. Such an act is unprecedented in South Australia and constituted a very serious attack upon a law enforcement agency based in this State.

1.3 Having regard to the seriousness of the incident, it was declared a "major crime" by the South Australian Police Force ("SAPOL"), and the investigation commenced immediately.

1.4 On Thursday 11 March 1994, Domenic Perre was arrested and charged with the murder of Detective Sergeant Bowen, and the attempted murder of Mr. Wallis. A preliminary examination of those charges commenced in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 19 July 1994, and on 8 August 1994 he was committed for trial in the Supreme Court. However, on 9 September 1994 the Director of Public Prosecutions submitted a nolle prosequi indicating that he did not propose to proceed with the charge. Since that time, no further charges have been brought against any person arising out of the incident.

 

2. Scope of Inquest

2.1 Section 25(1) of the Coroners Act provides:-

"A Coroner must as soon as practicable after the completion of an inquest give his or her finding by writing in the prescribed form setting out as far as has been ascertained the cause and circumstances of the event that was the subject of the inquest".

 

In my view, the "cause and circumstances" of the event in question here include the circumstances in which the bomb was sent to the NCA, and the person or persons responsible for sending it.

2.2 Effect of Section 26(3), Coroners Act 1975

Mr. Caldicott, counsel for Mr. Perre, submitted that Section 26(3) of the Coroners Act prevents me from making a finding which names any person as being responsible for, or even involved with the manufacture or sending of the bomb to the NCA. Section 26(3) reads:-

"A Coroner holding an inquest must not in the inquest make any finding, or suggestion, of criminal or civil liability".

 

2.3 Mr. Caldicott’s submission was, in essence, that since the sending of the bomb was clearly a premeditated criminal act in the circumstances of this case, a finding as to who was responsible for sending it amounts to a suggestion of criminal liability within the meaning of Section 26(3).

2.4 In my opinion, Mr. Caldicott’s submission is misconceived. In order to contravene Section 26(3), a coroner must not only deal with the cause and circumstances of the event in question, and thereby make findings of fact, but must go further and draw conclusions from those findings of fact which either find, or suggest, that the person in question has committed a criminal offence.

2.5 In my opinion, if Mr. Caldicott’s argument is to be accepted, a coroner would be prevented from making findings in even the most routine inquests where there was any suggestion that the circumstances had criminal or civil ramifications. For example, if a coroner was conducting an inquest into a road accident, Mr. Caldicott’s argument would suggest that he or she would be prevented from finding that a particular person was the driver of a car involved in the accident if the circumstances suggest that that driver may have committed a breach of the road rules. I think that this is an absurd conclusion and could not have been intended by Parliament. If the coroner went further in such a case, and suggested in his or her finding that the driver of that car had committed a breach of a particular section of the Road Traffic Act, then clearly Section 26(3) would have been breached.

2.6 I acknowledge that, in some cases, there may be a fine line between a finding that a person may have performed an act which caused the death of another, and a suggestion that the person has thereby committed a breach of the criminal law.

2.7 Section 19(3) of the Coroners Act (1985) Victoria states:-

"A coroner must not include in a finding or comment any statement that a person is or may be guilty of an offence".

 

I consider that this provision has a similar application to Section 26(3) of the South Australian Act, although it does not, of course, refer to civil liability. My understanding of the practice in Victoria is that it is similar to that adopted here. For example, in a recent finding, the State Coroner for Victoria concluded that a man had shot his sister-in-law, and had therefore "contributed" to her death (see finding dated 10 December 1998 into the death of Jennifer Ruth Tanner, Case No. 2001/96).

 

2.8 If Mr. Caldicott’s submission is to be accepted, my function in this inquest would have been limited to a finding that Detective Sergeant Bowen died as a result of injuries he received in the explosion on 2 March 1994. I would have been prevented from inquiring into whether a particular person may have been responsible.

2.9 In all the circumstances, I reject Mr. Caldicott’s submission and will proceed with these findings in the usual way.

 

3. Standard of proof

3.1 It was suggested by Mr. Quigley, counsel for Mrs. Bowen and the W.A. Police Union, that I would be entitled to make a finding that a particular person was responsible for the manufacture and/or sending of the bomb if the evidence established that fact on the balance of probabilities (T.4103). Mr. Rice, counsel for the NCA, agreed, but pointed out that I should have regard to the comments of the High Court in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60CLR at 336. Mr. Illingworth, counsel for SAPOL, agreed with Mr. Rice (T.4233). Mr. Caldicott, counsel for Mr. Perre, submitted that I should not make such a finding unless I was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of those facts (T.4239).

3.2 The well-known principle established by Briginshaw v Briginshaw was stated by Dixon J at p.361 as follows:-

"Except upon criminal cases to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. Everyone must feel that, when, for instance, the issue is on which of two dates an admitted occurrence took place, a satisfactory conclusion may be reached on materials of a kind that would not satisfy any sound and prudent judgment if the question was whether some act had been done involving grave moral delinquency ... It is often said that such an issue as fraud must be proved ‘clearly’, ‘unequivocally’, ‘strictly’ or ‘with certainty’ ... This does not mean that some standard of persuasion is fixed intermediate between the satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt required upon a criminal inquest and the reasonable satisfaction which in a civil issue may, not must, be based on a preponderance of probabilities. It means that the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is obtained".

 

3.3 I am sure that His Honour did not have an inquest such as the one before me in mind when he used the words "criminal inquest" in the above passage. At the time when Briginshaw was decided, coroners had the power to commit persons for trial if a prima facie case was established. That is not the case now, at least in South Australia.

3.4 The principle established in Briginshaw was recently considered in G v H (1994) 181CLR 387. Since Briginshaw, and notwithstanding the clear statements by Dixon J in the passage quoted above, some confusion has arisen concerning the standard of proof required when a "criminal" allegation is made in "non-criminal" proceedings. See for example, T v Medical Board of South Australia (1993) 58 SASR 382.

3.5 However, in G v H, the High Court rejected such an approach and returned to the formulation in Briginshaw. At p.399 of the judgment, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said:-

"It has been clear since the decision in Briginshaw v Briginshaw that in civil cases the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, with due regard being had to the nature of the issue involved so that ‘the seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal’. Thus, if there is an issue of ‘importance and gravity’ to use the words of the trial judge, due regard must be had to its important and grave nature.

 

Not every case involves issues of importance and gravity in the Briginshaw v Briginshaw sense. The need to proceed with caution is clear if, for example, there is an allegation of fraud or an allegation of criminal or moral wrong-doing. As in Briginshaw v Briginshaw where the allegation was adultery by a married woman, an allegation involving serious legal consequences when that case was decided".

(my underlining)

 

3.6 In the inquest before me, the allegation that a person may have constructed and forwarded a lethal explosive device which caused death and serious injury, clearly involves an allegation of wrong-doing of the most serious kind. The consequences of such a finding being made will be particularly serious. There will be a perception created in the public mind that a person against whom such a finding has been made is guilty of a criminal offence, even if no breach of Section 26(3) of the Coroners Act has occurred. If such a finding were to be made on less than an extremely rigorous assessment of the evidence, public confidence in the administration of justice might be eroded and unrealistic expectations might be placed upon the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions if the evidence is not sufficient to found criminal charges. It is also clear, however, that I should only consider the evidence that is before me, and it would not be appropriate to speculate about what may or may not happen in another jurisdiction with different rules.

 

4. The events of 2 March 1994

4.1 At just after 7.00a.m. on 2 March 1994 Mr. Brian Stone, who was employed at the NCA as a Security Services Officer ("SSO"), attended at the General Post Office and collected the NCA’s mail for the day. There was a red card in the post office box indicating that a package was to be collected from the counter. He collected the package, which was addressed to "NCA, Geofrey Bowen", and carried it under his arm back to his office on the 12^th floor of the building in Waymouth Street (T.507). Upon arrival at his desk, Stone entered the mail in the mail record book, noting that the sender’s name was "IBM", although the sender’s name was actually marked on the package as "IBM Promotions".

4.2 Bowen’s work area was on the 11^th floor of the building. At around 9.00a.m., he telephoned Stone, inquiring if some packages he had been expecting had arrived. In fact, he had been expecting the return of some exhibits from Canberra which he proposed to use in the prosecution of Perre for Telecommunications Act offences the following day (Wallis, T.71). I will discuss this issue in detail later.

4.3 Bowen went up to the 12^th floor to Stone’s desk. When he saw the parcel he told Stone that he had not been expecting anything about computers (Stone T.512). Because it was "unsolicited mail", Stone decided to scan the package, using a hand-held Garrett Super Scanner (of the type commonly seen at airports). He tested the scanner by passing it over his wristwatch, ascertained that it was working correctly, and then scanned the package by waving the scanner over the top and down one side (Stone T.516). The scanner did not sound an alarm and so Stone handed the package to Bowen, who then went into Wallis’ office which was nearby on the 12^th floor.

4.4 Wallis said that the package consisted of a yellow, red and white plastic "Express Post" pack. Bowen brought it into his office, placed it on the desk and opened the parcel. Wallis said that it had very neat writing on it, "as if stencilled" (T.73).

4.5 After he opened the plastic outer covering, Bowen looked inside and said, with tragic irony,

"It might be a bomb".

(T.72).

 

After examining the package further, he said:-

"Well, there’s no wires".

(T.75).

He then removed the cardboard box from within the plastic pack. Using scissors Wallis had brought from Stone’s office, Bowen proceeded to open the cardboard box by breaking the masking-tape seal. Wallis described what then happened as follows:-

"There was a loud crack, like a rifle shot or something similar, and I remember Geoff letting out a strangled-type cry, a yell, and falling sideways, and then - it must have been almost instantaneously - then there was an enormous buffeting of - like wind buffeting and an enormous sound that I can only describe as very very loud static. That is what it was like. I was immediately blinded. That was the last thing I saw".

(T.75-76)

4.6 Sergeant M.J. Thomas of the SAPOL Crime Scene Unit of the Technical Services Branch, who attended the scene soon after the explosion, and who was closely involved in the ensuing investigation, described the effect of the explosion as follows:-

"(it) shattered furnishings that the device was resting on. The pressure wave obviously broke out of the southern window, but it also travelled upwards towards the ceiling, above which was a slab, a concrete slab, and the pressure wave then travelled along underneath that slab between the slab and the ceiling, so it knocked down all the suspended ceiling, the air-conditioning ducting. It cracked gyprock interior walls ... and an adjacent toilet block. In adjacent offices, Mr. Ganley’s office and one further west, it knocked books out of shelves, and in fact in Mr. Ganley’s office it partially knocked the bookcase off the wall, so it dislodged it from its anchorages ... (in Mr. Wallis’ office) the western walls were scorched and coated to a large amount by red phosphorus or the residues of red phosphorus. The western wall towards the southern window - I am talking about the south-western corner - was heavily scorched as a result of fire. The portion of wall under the southern window, the gyprock interior lining, had been cracked and actually contained fragments of battery casing".

(T.344)

4.7 The explosion caused the door to Wallis’ office to slam shut and it would appear that the ceiling had fallen down behind it so that it could not be opened easily. The witnesses described the desperate attempts to open the door involving Scott Work, John Ganley, Brian Stone, Mark Kaczmarek, Jeff Smith and Mike Schultz. After they were able to force the door open they found Wallis standing against the wall. He was obviously burnt and severely injured. He was escorted out of the office and fire extinguishers were obtained. Bowen was found lying in a corner of the room shortly afterwards. It is noteworthy that at this time the automatic sprinkling system in the office had not activated.

4.8 Fire and ambulance crews arrived within minutes. The ambulance officers record that their arrival was at about 9.24a.m. (see the statement of Mr. Whitelaw-Jenkins, Exhibit C.20a, p3). Bowen had been dragged from the burning office into the corridor near the lift. When examined, he still had a pulse and was spontaneously breathing, although it was apparent to the ambulance officer that his injuries were unsurvivable. A laryngeal mask was inserted, but soon afterwards he stopped breathing. He was ventilated using a bag but at 0938 hours it was noted that there was no pulse, no heart sounds and no breathing effort. In consultation with Dr. W.M. Griggs, the Director of Trauma Services at the Royal Adelaide Hospital, and head of the retrieval team in attendance, resuscitation was discontinued at 0939 hours and Dr. Griggs pronounced his life extinct (Exhibit C.23a, p2).

4.9 Wallis was conveyed to the Royal Adelaide Hospital, arriving at 9.41a.m. He suffered trauma to both eyes and severe burn injuries. He had also suffered a number of small penetrating injuries as a result of the blast. He has had to undergo a succession of operations and other medical procedures since that time and will suffer permanent disability as a result of his injuries (see the statement of Dr. Griffin, Exhibit C.25a, p2-3).

4.10 It is appropriate to record here that the NCA staff present on 2 March 1994 acted with great courage and professionalism. As Mr. Bathgate, the Comcare Investigator, observed:-

"The actions by NCA personnel on the scene once the explosion had occurred appeared to me to be characterised by coolness, commonsense, an eagerness to assist in rescue and fire-fighting and so on. Without their attitudes and approach, matters could have been much worse".

(Exhibit C.122a, p7).

Mr. Paul Foley, the Regional Manager (Operations) of the NCA Adelaide Office, agreed, characterising their behaviour as heroic. As he pointed out, his colleagues had no idea at that stage what had caused the explosion, or even whether there might be a further explosion, and yet this did not deter them in their efforts to get into Mr. Wallis’ office and do what they could to assist him and Sergeant Bowen (T.3280).

 

5. Cause of death

5.1 A post mortem examination of Sergeant Bowen’s body was conducted by Dr. J.D. Gilbert, forensic pathologist, during the afternoon of 2 March 1994. Dr. Gilbert’s conclusion was that the cause of death was "haemorrhage due to blast injuries to the upper and lower limbs" (see Exhibit C.1a, p1). Dr. Gilbert confirmed Mr. Wallis’ description of where Bowen was standing at the time of the explosion. He said:-

"The pattern of injury was consistent with the deceased standing erect at a desk while grasping the bomb package on the desk surface with the left hand and having the right hand in close proximity to the package".

(Exhibit C.1, p13).

 

6. Security at the NCA Office

6.1 One aspect of the circumstances of Sergeant Bowen’s death which was examined at the inquest is whether more effective procedures for examining incoming mail at the Adelaide office of the NCA may have prevented the death of Sergeant Bowen and the serious injuries to Mr. Wallis.

6.2 I have already mentioned that Mr. Stone had been equipped with a Garrett "Super Scanner" metal detecting wand with which to check incoming mail.

6.3 SA Police took possession of the Garrett wand from the NCA office on either the first or the second day of the investigation. It was found in the security office underneath the bench (Thomas, T.382). It was retained in secure property storage at Angas Street Police Station until it was handed to Mrs. Atkins, counsel assisting me in this inquiry. Surprisingly, even though it appears not to have been used since 1994, the batteries remain charged, and the instrument is still useable to this day.

6.4 Phillip Stearnes, the S.A. distributor for Garrett Electronics Inc., an American company, told me that the Garrett Super Scanner is really a weapons detector. He said:-

"It’s not one to be used for drug or explosive detection".

(T.1246)

 

He drew attention to the promotional brochure, which refers to the instrument as a "hand-held body scanner" (see Exhibit C.123a). The brochure describes the purpose of the instrument as being to:-

"Detect all concealed metal weapons, including the smallest knives and guns".

 

It makes no reference to using the instrument as a mail scanner.

 

 

6.5 Mr. Stearnes said that the instrument could be used for checking parcels, but

"You have to do all six sides to make sure and it would be best to come as close to the box ... even putting the blade on the box and going across. If you were (200-300 millimetres) far away ... you could miss it".

(T.1254)

 

6.6 When Stearnes used the Garrett Super Scanner to examine the mock-up explosive device (prepared by the SAPOL technical officers led by Sergeant Thomas, Exhibit C.97d), it detected the presence of metal with "no problems there at all" (T.1255). Mr. Stearnes noted that it detected the presence of metal on four of the six sides (T.1256).

6.7 Stearnes was quite clear that, in his view, the Garrett Super Scanner was not suitable for the purpose for which it was being used by Mr. Stone on 2 March 1994 (T.1298). He said that if it was being used to check incoming mail, it should have been used in conjunction with an X-ray scanner (T.1304).

6.8 Mr. Stone agreed with Mr. Stearnes. He said that after the bombing he was given another wand (which was supposed to be more sensitive) but that he found both of them "pretty useless" (T.553). He was aware of the purpose for which the Garrett instrument was designed. He said:-

"It’s not made for picking up very small pieces of metal - more for scanning people for metal objects like guns or knives".

(T.554)

 

6.9 Stone also demonstrated how he used the Garrett Super Scanner to examine the mock-up parcel, using Exhibit C.97d. He described how he would have held the package in his left hand and operated the wand with his right hand. He would have checked the instrument on his watch band and ensured that it was working properly (T.516). This was confirmed by Mr. Wallis (T.126). Stone described how he would have held the package from the bottom, and moved the wand over the top and down the side, holding it an inch or two inches away (T.516). When he demonstrated this action in court, the wand did not detect the presence of metal in Exhibit C.97d. When he ran the detector down the flat side of the parcel it did emit a sound (T.518), indicating the presence of metal. From this, it is reasonable to conclude that Mr. Stone did not run the wand down the flat side of the parcel on 2 March 1994. I reject Mr. Rice’s submission that it was possible that the wand malfunctioned. It has shown no sign of malfunction since, and it worked correctly when Stone tested it on his watch.

6.10 When Sergeant Thomas conducted the same demonstration (apparently without knowledge of the way in which Stone did it), he detected the presence of metal in the package at the first attempt (T.378-9).

6.11 Although the Garrett Super Scanner was no doubt simple to use, it seems to me that it was an inadequate system for the examination of suspect packages, because any such system should avoid the possibility that it will fail through errors of technique. In the event that a system relies on technique, then very rigorous training is called for.

6.12 This conclusion is fortified by the results of an analysis of these systems conducted by Major D.S. Williams, Defence Technical Liaison Officer, Australian Bomb Data Centre, in April and May 1994. Major Williams’ conclusions were:-

"26. None of the machines tested were able to detect all the non-metallic mail bombs. All of the machines resulted in non-hazardous items being segregated for further investigation. It is believed that, given the current level of technology available, no machine would have completely met the user’s requirements (Annex A). Despite this, the use of equipment to support trained and alert staff is a valid and effective method of increasing the detection of mail bombs and hence protecting life and property.

 

27. Metal detectors are considered to be of limited effect, but may have a role for the quick screening of small mail items which do not have any visible indicators suggesting suspect mail; a discriminatory metal detector which will pass the common metal items is preferable to one which simply detects the presence of metal. Metal detectors should be supplemented by an X-ray system to enable a visual examination of suspect or larger items. Of the metal detectors evaluated the ScanMail 10K and the Kitson were considered to be the most appropriate for Phase One screening as they had a discretionary capability. The Evaluation panel was divided on the advantages of being able to manually tune or calibrate the equipment, as for the Kitson, or having the sensor precalibrated as in the ScanMail 10K.

 

28. All the X-ray equipment evaluated was considered suitable to varying degrees for the screening of mail. The type of equipment best suited to a particular Department or Agency will depend upon factors such as the volume of mail to be processed and hence the number of hours per day that the equipment will be in use, the number of trained personnel available to use the machines and budgetary considerations.

 

29. Both the Torex II and Interceptor Cabinet X-ray machines were considered suitable for the screening of mail in low volume installations".

(Exhibit C.123e)

6.13 Training

Mr. Stone told me that he had received no training in using the Garrett Super Scanner. He was shown how to use it by the person whose job he took (T.509), although he would have been surprised if that training took more than a minute or so (T.573). The person who gave him this "training", Mr. Jennings, said that it took about five minutes (T.1203). Mr. James Bathgate, an Investigator employed by Comcare to investigate the work-related injuries sustained by NCA staff arising out of the bombing, compiled a detailed report where a number of these issues were addressed. His report is Exhibit C.122a. At p.8 of the report Mr. Bathgate concluded:-

"I found no clear evidence that staff had been trained and given awareness raising techniques to cause them to exercise sufficiently high level of healthy suspicion and therefore to adequately check items".

 

I agree.

 

6.14 Procedures established by the NCA for the checking of incoming mail

Mr. Peter Wallis told me that there were no such procedures (T.77, T.81-2, T.89). Neither Mr. Wallis nor Ms. Lynch received any induction or training in relation to incoming mail (T.89, T.263).

6.15 Mr. Norman Raeburn, the Deputy Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, told me that a document dealing with mail screening procedures was issued by the Federal Justice Office ("FJO") on 9 February 1993 and was intended to be disseminated widely. Mr. Rice, counsel for the NCA, told me that the NCA has no record of having received the document, although Mr. Raeburn said that in the normal course of events it would have been provided to them (T.3973). The document is Exhibit C.163. It refers to previous mail bomb attacks (p.1). The procedure suggested involves the following headings:-

• establish a screening point;

• allocate responsibility;

• develop a system;

• brief staff.

An annexure to the procedure advises how to identify suspect articles (Annexure A).

6.16 Even though they had not received the FJO document, the NCA had established a screening point (Stone’s office), had allocated responsibility (to Stone), but they did not develop a clear system. As it happened, Stone identified the article as "suspect" on his own initiative since it was from an unknown source, it was unexpected, and the name of the addressee was incorrectly spelled. These are some of the characteristics outlined in Annexure A which Stone identified even without training or reference to the document. No doubt his experience as a Federal police officer assisted him there.

6.17 Stone had a sheet of paper which instructed him to scan "suspect" mail (Exhibit C.107d), although he had received no instructions as to what constituted "suspect" mail, or on how this scanning was to occur. This was the first package Stone had recognised as "suspect" since he had commenced at the NCA in February 1991 (T.510). As far as I could ascertain, there was only one other occasion when this had occurred, when Jennings identified a package prior to Stone’s commencement, and took it to the SAPOL Bomb Squad, where it was X-rayed and then opened and found to contain micro-fiche film (T.1203-4).

6.18 The NCA had another piece of equipment known as a Postal Protection Unit ("PPU") which Stone had never used (T.511).

6.19 The limitations of the PPU were recognised as early as 12 June 1990. In order to understand whether, and at what stage, various personnel within the NCA became aware of these deficiencies, it is necessary to examine a chronology of reports and correspondence. The documents were supplied by the NCA and comprise Exhibit C.98 with its annexures. The chronology with relevant significant events is as follows:-

• a report dated 23 May 1990 was issued by the NCA Security Adviser (Annexure C). The level of threat to the NCA’s Adelaide office was assessed as being "medium to high" following several recent events including a break-in at covert premises in January of that year, a break-in of the Chief Investigator’s vehicle, a break-in of the senior police officer’s residence, a break-in of the Member’s residence, the bombing of the Member’s car, leaks, and an extensive media campaign. The report recommended the purchase of a "cost-effective content examination device or X-ray machine" on the basis that the "present Kitson metal detector has limited applications and requires rehabilitation and testing" (para.56U);

 

• on 12 June 1990, Mr. Wayne Brilley, the NCA Security Adviser, wrote a Minute to Mr. Dean Hawke, the General Manager (Corporate) of the NCA, confirming earlier advice (Annexure D). Paragraphs 4 and 5 of his Minute read:-

"4. The present Kitcon (Kitson) postal metal detectors are considered totally inappropriate to the needs of the Authority. At best, they are capable of detecting staples, pins and metal clips in documents transmitted in envelopes or parcels of a relatively small size. This equipment is subject to inaccurate readings and requires regular recalibration. They are incapable of handling any larger articles.

 

5. This is particularly critical in screening direct-delivery goods to our premises and articles and briefcases carried by visitors. ..."

 

Mr. Brilley identified the most appropriate equipment to purchase as a "Line Scan System 12" with a cost of approximately $63,000.00, which he described as "a little cost inhibitive" (para.10), and that "its overall dimension may restrict its strategic placement" (para.11);

 

• on 19 June 1990 (Annexure E) the Regional Executive Officer, Adelaide officer, Ms. Jacqui Farquhar, wrote to the Adelaide Member referring to the May security report, and gave comments on the recommendations therein. At para. 25, Ms. Farquhar said:-

"X-ray equipment may have to wait depending on cost and real necessity or likely necessity. This may be excessive requirement in real terms which could wait until funds available perhaps later in the year. I will get a costing on this".

 

There is a hand-written note next to that paragraph "I agree".

The tenor of that comment indicates that Ms. Farquhar and the person who agreed (presumably the Member) thought that Brilley’s recommendation should receive a low priority, as they were not convinced of its "real necessity or likely necessity" and could "wait until funds available". One might question the purpose of engaging a specialist security adviser to provide reports on such issues, when his recommendations can be dismissed so lightly, by people without experience in security matters.

In his commentary to these documents in Exhibit C.98, the current Member, Mr. Irwin, said:-

"It is noted that the REO’s Minute to the Member followed a meeting of a staff committee. By the Member’s endorsements it was agreed to recalibrate the equipment (the PPU) rather than purchase a screening device or X-ray equipment".

(p.2);

• a further response to the review is contained in Annexure F. In relation to Brilley’s recommendation 25, it is commented:-

"It was noted that the cost of this equipment would be approximately $10,000.00. In view of this amount, it was AGREED that if a package appears slightly suspicious, then the SSO would arrange for it to be screened through SAPOL".

(p.4)

It is not clear how the cost of the equipment has fallen from $63,000.00 to $10,000.00. In any event, it is clear that Brilley’s recommendation has been dismissed and the PPU (previously described as "totally inappropriate") has been retained;

• a Minute dated 3 January 1991 to Mr. Foley from Brilley referred to a further inspection of the Adelaide office on 17-18 November 1990 (Annexure G). The Minute referred to certain outstanding matters, but no specific reference was made to mail screening procedures or equipment (see Annexure G);

• Brilley conducted a further review of the Adelaide office security in May 1991 and in his Minute of 17 July 1991 (Annexure H), he comments:-

"38. The Postal Protection Units (PPU) are in use throughout the NCA with the hand-held metal detectors used as a back-up. The Adelaide office and other NCA officers have found the PPU cumbersome and ineffective. Recently I contacted KFH and Associates in Sydney (an agent for Garrett Security Systems USA) and discussed their new "Letterscanner Explosives/Metal Detector". The unit is rugged, user-friendly and capable of handling a large volume of articles up to the A3 size. Although this model is yet to be approved for Government use, it appears to be a suitable replacement for the existing PPU’s".

(p.7);

• another inspection of the Adelaide office security arrangements was conducted in June 1992. The report from Ms. Ward and Mr. Winner to Brilley dated 25 August 1992 is Annexure J to Exhibit C.98. Paragraph 11 of the Minute states:-

"All goods and mail are delivered to the security office on the 12^th floor. The security officers open all mail and items are scanned with hand-held Garrett metal detectors. The Postal Protection Unit (PPU) is a very old (portable) model and is rarely used. There is little space in the security office to allow the permanent set-up of the PPU. A more recent model of the PPU is required. Scanning of mail should be undertaken in another area, preferably a strong point in the building with masonry walls".

 

On 23 September 1992 a Minute to Ms. Nelson from Ms. Williams, the Security Liaison Officer, recommends

"Para.8 Postal Protection Unit - A new parcel protection unit should be acquired and Security Branch will provide the appropriate advice.

 

ACTION: After speaking to the Director of Security I suggest that we purchase either the Kitson PPU-1A, PPU-1B or PPU-1C, which is available from Kitson Electronics in Melbourne for approximately $5,500.00"

(Annexure K, p.2).

 

The amount which was intended to be spent in relation to this issue had been steadily decreasing since Brilley’s initial recommendation in 1990. It is not immediately apparent as to whose recommendation led to these progressive reductions in cost each time the issue was revisited;

 

• on 24 September 1992 Nelson wrote to Brilley with copies to Hawke and Foley, referring to the proposed expenditure of $5,500.00 for the purchase of a new PPU, and said:-

"I acknowledge the necessity for these items. However, our budget limitations prevent us from making these necessary purchases.

 

This office therefore requests that alternate funding arrangements be sought from the national office".

(Annexure L);

• on 28 September 1992, Brilley wrote back to Nelson, advising that alternate funding was not available from the national office budget. He said:-

"It is suggested that these items be programmed into next year’s budget".

(Annexure M)

 

6.20 This correspondence in Annexure M seems to have been the last time that the issue was addressed prior to 2 March 1994 when the bomb exploded. Mr. Irwin’s summary observes that a replacement for the PPU was never purchased. Notwithstanding this, he observed:-

"Subject to recognising that it may not have the benefit of all the evidence which will no doubt be heard by you, in the view of the Authority, based on what it has learnt of the events prior to the bombing, it would not be fair to say that there was any failure to take reasonable precautions which could have prevented the bomb exploding. The instructions at the time required suspicious parcels to be referred to SAPOL for further examination. While it is true that there were recommendations to purchase equipment and these recommendations were not acted upon, in the view of the Authority there was no information available to it as to an established level of threat which suggested that the purchase of the recommended equipment was necessary".

(p.5-6)

6.21 In my opinion, this observation completely overlooks the fact that a threat assessment was carried out as part of the original review in 1990, having regard to the incidents which had occurred prior to that time. Mr. Brilley assessed the threat as being moderate to high, and on the basis of that recommended the purchase of much more capable and sophisticated scanning equipment. That report was revisited over and over again in the ensuing years, and each time it was revisited, the recommendation was watered down, to the extent that by 1992 an upgraded PPU was being discussed at a cost of $5,500.00. Nothing had changed since 1990 to alter the original assessment, and no further assessment had been conducted.

6.22 Foley acknowledged that after the Minute dated 28 September 1992 (Annexure M), the cost of the new PPU should have been built into the budget for the 1993/94 financial year (T.3235). He was unable to explain why it was not. There appears to have been a "dead end" following that correspondence.

6.23 It is clear that Foley did not have a comprehensive understanding of the issues arising out of Brilley’s original report. He thought that the hand-held scanner and the PPU performed the same task, and he was unaware of the fact that the hand-held scanner was only regarded as a "back-up", and that the PPU was regarded as "totally inappropriate" (T.3302-3310). He had not read the original report until relatively recently. He commenced in his position in October 1990 (see T.3133-3137).

6.24 Mr. Scott Work acted in the position of Regional Executive Officer in the Adelaide office of the NCA in 1993. In the course of his duties, he travelled to Melbourne in February of that year, and asked the Security Manager for a copy of the security specifications for the Adelaide office building. He alleged that he was told that none were available, that they did have a threat assessment with recommendations for security levels (presumably the report of May 1990, Annexure C), but that he refused to give it to him on the basis that it had to be rewritten to "produce recommendations that the NCA would be willing to fund" (T.635).

6.25 Hawke denied that any threat assessment had to be rewritten on this basis (T.3863), saying that threat assessments were carried out by ASIO and that they would not be prepared to countenance that type of activity (T.3864). He ventured that the failure to purchase the equipment as recommended was not made because of a lack of funds. He acknowledged that there was "something else structural happening in the Authority " (T.3895).

6.26 Hawke said that the Adelaide office had a track record of "tailing up" (hurriedly spending any unexhausted funds in the budget at the end of the financial year), and that Brilley’s refusal to fund the purchase of the new PPU from National Office budget may have been made on the basis that he did not believe that the Adelaide office budget could not meet the cost of the purchase (T.3906, 3917). This may explain why the equipment was never purchased.

6.27 Interview room on 11^th floor

Domenic Perre was taken to the 11^th floor of the Adelaide NCA office on 13 September 1993, after he had been arrested by Sergeant Bowen and Sergeant Lynch. He was taken there again on 28 September 1993, when he attended with his brother Adam to collect his personal property. On both occasions, he would have seen the investigators’ work stations while being escorted to the interview room (see the diagram, Exhibit C.99b).

6.28 Mr. Wallis observed that the interview room was in the "secure area" of the building, and was near the computer server in which valuable records were stored. He observed that if Bowen had been at his own work station when he had opened the parcel, not only would he and possibly other investigators have been killed, but the computer system may have been extensively damaged either in the explosion or in the ensuing fire (T.116). He said that he and other staff were concerned about the siting of the interview room on the 11^th floor, and took their concerns to Foley, but that the issue "fell on deaf ears" (T.78-9). Foley said that he did not remember any concerns being expressed by staff on this topic (T.3128, 3214).

6.29 Lynch explained that the room was established as an interview room because the amendments to South Australian legislation which required the video-taping of suspects’ interviews had come into force more quickly than they expected (T.244), and they were under pressure to establish a facility. She acknowledged that the interview room was not used very often, and in fact she had never used it in the three years that she was there until 13 September 1993 (T.245-8). Lynch said that she was also concerned about the position of the interview room, and she spoke to Chief Investigator Blue about it - she explained that on occasions they asked investigators to leave their work stations if they were bringing certain people in to the interview room (T.235).

6.30 Both Inspector Ganley (T.160) and Detective Wright (T.3369) told me that, in their experience, such arrangements were common in SAPOL offices. Ganley conceded that, with hindsight, the siting of the interview room was "probably a problem" (T.160).

6.31 It is not possible to find that the siting of the interview room on the 11^th floor of the NCA office, and in the secure area, played any part in the subsequent massive security breach which resulted in the bomb explosion. There is no evidence of any connection between Perre’s visits and that event.

6.32 I am therefore unable to make a formal recommendation pursuant to Section 25(2) of the Coroners Act, in relation to this issue. However, in my view, the need for such basic security is certainly something which those charged with the responsibility of designing offices for police departments and organisations such as the NCA should take into account (see Wright’s evidence about SAPOL police stations at T.3369).

 

6.33 Conclusion

On 2 March 1994, in a tragic and ironic coincidence, there was a meeting in Melbourne to discuss how another review into NCA, to be jointly conducted between the NCA and ASIO, was to proceed (T.3853). After the bombing, it was decided that the security review would be conducted by ASIO alone (T.3872). I was not advised of the outcome of that further review, nor did I inquire into the current security arrangements the NCA have put in place. For those reasons, recommendations pursuant to Section 25(2) of the Coroners Act would be pointless. It is to be hoped that any recommendations that did arise out of the further review by ASIO were paid more careful attention than were the recommendations made by Mr. Brilley in 1990.

 

7. Background

7.1 After the explosion, Domenic Perre was regarded as the primary suspect in the investigation. In order to understand why, it is necessary to examine a number of investigations into criminal activity which had taken place during the several years prior to March 1994.

7.2 Operation Cerberus

Sergeant P.R. Coombs is a Western Australian police officer who had been involved in an investigation into large-scale cannabis cultivation. The investigation originated with the W.A. Drug Squad in 1988. He told me that the investigation went for about six years, and led to the longest criminal trial in Western Australia’s history.

7.3 Coombs told me that the cannabis cultivation was carried out by people of southern Italian background and was led by a man named Bruno Romeo, who had evaded capture for some time. The investigation later extended to every State in Australia, and the NCA became involved. Operation Cerberus began with the nation-wide hunt for Romeo, which culminated in his arrest in Lismore, New South Wales in December 1992 (T.1418). Although Mr. Wallis (T.94) and other witnesses suggested that Bowen was involved in Romeo’s arrest and extradition to Western Australia, Coombs told me that this was not so. He said that Bowen had returned to W.A. to attend court at the time of the arrest, and that he was not directly involved in Romeo’s arrest and extradition. He said that Romeo’s arrest received national media coverage, but Bowen’s name did not receive any particular prominence nationally, except as part of a team. His name did receive mention in the Adelaide Press because Bowen was based here (T.1426). It would seem that Coombs received the bulk of the personal publicity.

7.4 Bowen was seconded from W.A. Police to the NCA and assigned to the Adelaide office in June 1992. Domenic Perre’s name did not receive particular prominence in the investigation until 1993, when a large cannabis plantation was discovered on a cattle station known as Hidden Valley, near Daly Waters in the Northern Territory. Superintendent S.D. Young of the N.T. Police told me that after a period of surveillance of the crop area, two simultaneous raids on the homestead and the crop site were carried out on 21 August 1993, a number of people were arrested, and 10,553 cannabis plants were located.

7.5 At least one of the men guarding the crop site was armed with a high-powered weapon (T.1564).

7.6 On 20 August 1993, the day before the raid, a hired campervan carrying 79.3 kilograms of compressed cannabis was apprehended and the two occupants were arrested. One of the occupants was Frank Perre, Domenic Perre’s brother. It was later established that the campervan had been hired in South Australia by Dominic Perre (T.1564).

7.7 Another person arrested at the crop site was Antonio Perre, uncle of Domenic and Frank Perre, who had recently arrived in Australia from Italy.

7.8 On 22 August 1993, the day after the raid, Young received the first of several telephone calls which culminated in a call on 24 August 1993 at 8.45p.m. Young identified the caller as the same person on each occasion, and who had identified himself during the first call as "Dom", the brother of Frank Perre. He said that he believed he had given "Dom" the impression that he was there not as a police officer, but as a criminal intending to steal the cannabis from the crop site (T.1572). During the final call on 24 August 1993, he identified himself to the caller as "Simon". The telephone conversation went as follows:-

"H/S Who’s that?

I/S Who’s that?

H/S I asked first.

I/S Simon.

H/S Get fucked you son of a bitch, if I ever get my hands on you, I’ll waste you".

(Exhibit C.80a, p5).

7.9 Young told me that he was confident that in each of the six telephone conversations he described, the caller was the same person (T.1603). He indicated to Mrs. Atkins, counsel assisting, that he would not be able to identify the voice. However, in a particularly telling exchange with Perre, who was cross-examining him, the following evidence was given:-

"Q. In your statement of 4 October 1993, you stated that at 1105 hours on a Sunday, you answered the phone and you had a conversation with a person you now believe to be Domenic Perre. On what basis did you now believe that that was Domenic Perre?

 

A. In the first phone call at 1105, he identified himself as Don, or Dom, the brother of Frank. The only Frank that was with me at the time was Frank Perre, who I subsequently discovered had a brother called Domenic. I have now heard your voice in court, and I am satisfied it is the same person I spoke to on the telephone.

 

Q. Yesterday, you stated that you wouldn’t be able to recognise the voice.

A. I hadn’t heard your voice since 1993, and yesterday at 4.27 when you asked for an adjournment I heard your voice and I became satisfied".

(T.1610)

7.10 It soon became apparent to the investigators of the Hidden Valley drug crop that the persons arrested at the scene were not the only ones involved in the criminal enterprise. The investigation extended to Domenic Perre and others in Adelaide.

7.11 Search of Perre’s premises 6 September 1993

A team of police officers led by Sergeant Bowen attended at Domenic Perre’s house at Cross Keys Road, Salisbury on 6 September 1993. They had a warrant issued pursuant to Section 4 of the Criminal Investigation (Extraterritorial Offences) Act 1984 by a Magistrate on 25 August 1993. The warrant was not addressed to any particular police officer but to "any member of the police force, with such assistants as the member thinks necessary ..." (see Exhibit C.136).

7.12 The police had attended the premises on two previous occasions in order to execute the warrant, but had found nobody at home. This was also the case on 6 September 1993, but they decided to proceed. Included among the officers present at the search were Sergeant Bowen, Sergeant Lynch, Detective Wright, and other officers from the NCA.

During the search, Bowen located two briefcases under the bed in the master bedroom. The briefcases contained electronic equipment which appeared to be capable of being used to intercept telecommunications. After obtaining legal advice from the Federal Police, the equipment was seized.

7.13 The search was thorough, and, according to Wright, it would have been obvious that the house had been searched. A number of pornographic video-tapes were discovered in the wardrobe and these were left lying on the bed (T.3347).

7.14 Perre was obviously annoyed after discovering that his premises had been searched and telephoned the Deputy Director of Investigations, Mr. Ganley, that afternoon. Ganley said that Perre suggested that a number of his firearms were missing, together with a laptop computer. When he was asked whether he was alleging that the police had stolen these items, Perre replied "No, you said that, not me. If I have any complaints I will make it through my solicitor" (T.157). Ganley added that Perre "basically suggested that some of my officers needed lessons in searching premises and he just said they left the place in an untidy state" (T.191). In particular, Ganley said that Perre indicated to him during the telephone conversation that he was particularly annoyed with Geoff Bowen (T.202).

7.15 During the conduct of the search, a telephone call was received from Perre’s solicitor, Mr. Peter Waye. The officers present confirmed that Bowen identified himself to Waye during that telephone conversation (see the evidence of Work, T.592).

7.16 In fact, Perre reported the theft of his firearms to the Para Hills Police Station. Detective V.B. Mitchell attended at his address on 5 October 1993. Mitchell said that the following exchange occurred:-

"Q. Do you think the NCA took your goods?

 

A. Well Yates your Inspector said no. So I don’t know. Bowen he’s the one in charge, ask him.

 

Q. Who?

 

A. Bowen from the NCA he’s handling the matter".

(see Exhibit C.85a, p2-3).

 

It is apparent from this exchange that Perre knew perfectly well that Bowen was in charge of the search of his premises. This fact becomes significant in view of a conversation with Detective Sergeant Presgrave on 2 March 1994, in which he denied that he knew who was in charge. I will deal with this in more detail later.

 

7.17 Arrest of Domenic Perre on 13 September 1993

On 13 September 1993 Bowen and Lynch attended at the offices of Mr. Waye in order to interview Perre concerning the telecommunications equipment. Perre declined to answer questions and Bowen arrested him for breaching Section 85ZKB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Commonwealth).

7.18 Wright told me that Bowen had told him that he had been instructed by Ganley not to arrest Perre, but that he should be reported for the offence instead. I was informed by Mr. Rice, counsel for the NCA, that Ganley denied that he had given any such instruction, and that he left it to the discretion of the officers concerned (T.4334). Whatever arrangement or indication had been given to Perre or his solicitor prior to the arrest, Lynch told me that Perre appeared "shocked and indignant" at being arrested (T.228).

7.19 Following the arrest, Perre was taken to the 11^th floor of the NCA office in Waymouth Street, Adelaide, where he was placed in the interview room while the charge was typed. Lynch prepared the documentation, and nominated Bowen as the Informant (the person bringing the charge) (see her statement, Exhibit C.100, p4).

7.20 After the necessary paperwork was attended to, Perre was conveyed to the City Watchhouse at the Adelaide Police Station, where he was taken into custody. Bowen and Lynch were accompanied by Wright, since Wright was a SAPOL member seconded to the NCA, and was familiar with the building.

7.21 While they were waiting to gain entrance to the City Watchhouse, Bowen was behaving towards Perre in a way which Wright described as "calculated to antagonise" (T.3350). He referred to plastic identification badges which had been found at Perre’s house on 6 September, and made derogatory remarks such as "Where’s your sheriff’s badge", or words to that effect (T.3350). He said that Perre remained "cold", and continued to stare "fixedly at the wall" (T.3350).

7.22 Perre appeared in the Adelaide Magistrates Court the morning after his arrest. The case was eventually listed for trial on 3 March 1994. As things transpired, the bomb exploded on 2 March 1994 and Sergeant Bowen, the main prosecution witness, was killed. The case was adjourned to 9 May 1994 but was not proceeded with.

7.23 Coombs’ allegation of threats to Bowen

Sergeant Coombs told me that Bowen had told him, in general terms, that Perre had threatened him. He was unable to be specific as to the precise nature of the threats (T.1433). Coombs said that Bowen was concerned, but not overly so, not to the point of being "paranoid" (T.1421).

7.24 Coombs said that he reported this information to the Perth office of the NCA, and he assumed that it would have reached the SAPOL investigators (T.1437-8). Neither the NCA nor SAPOL have any record of such information being reported by Coombs. Ganley (T.154), Lynch (T.237), Wright (T.3352), Work (T.594), Wallis (T.97) and Foley (T.3124) all denied knowledge of it. It seems highly likely that if the threat(s) were made, at least one of these people would have heard about them.

7.25 In Coombs’ statement (Exhibit C.86a, p2), he said:-

"At no time, both during and after this investigation were any threats made towards Detective Sergeant Bowen".

 

 

When questioned about that, Coombs explained that he was confining his remark to the Romeo investigation (T.1444). I have great doubt about Coombs’ credibility on this issue. His statement is clear and unambiguous, and contradicts his evidence. I am not satisfied that the threats were made.

 

8. The investigation

8.1 As I have already mentioned, the death of Detective Sergeant Bowen was declared a major crime very soon after the incident. Indeed, Detective Sergeant Swan told me that the declaration was made within about ten minutes of the incident (T.3637). He told me that, in accordance with procedures established by SAPOL, the chain of command was then established. The base commander was Assistant Commissioner A.C. Watkins, the field commanders were Detective Superintendent Litster and Detective Inspector Paynter, the administration sergeant was Detective Sergeant Swan, and the primary investigation team were Detective Sergeant Presgrave and Detective Senior Constable Stapleton. In addition, a number of secondary teams comprising about twelve detectives were also established. The exhibits officer was Detective Loechel. In addition to the detectives, a number of uniformed police officers attended the scene, together with the Organised Crime Task Force, technical and forensic officers.

8.2 The technical investigation commenced at the scene immediately. A large number of fragments were collected and painstakingly analysed, and Mr. Wallis’ office and the explosive device itself were reconstructed.

8.3 From analysis of the fragments collected, the Express Post satchel was identified, and in particular the extremely neat writing (as if it had been stencilled) of the addressee’s name and address was noted, as well as the fact that Bowen’s Christian name was misspelt as "Geofrey" (Exhibit C.104b, p.20).

8.4 The cardboard box, which was identified as an Australia Post "BC" sized "Postpak", was also reconstructed from fragments. A number of fragments still had the remains of adhesive tape adhering to their surfaces.

8.5 The discovery of numerous pieces of black plastic, a screw and two screw fragments enabled a Reptron HL2853 "Zippy Box" to be reconstructed. A Zippy Box is a plastic container, usually used to contain electronic componentry. Thomas said that his inquiries established that the only outlet for the particular type of box involved here was Dick Smith Electronics Pty. Ltd. (Exhibit C.104b, p.23).

8.6 Fragments of a "Duracell" 9 volt battery and holder were also identified (Exhibit C.104b, p.24).

8.7 A "NTE mini-micro" firing switch was reconstructed from fragments found at the scene. Thomas established that such switches are available from Dick Smith Electronics Pty. Ltd. and also Force Electronics (Exhibit C.104b, p.26).

8.8 A single large fragment of a detonator found at the scene enabled the investigators to conclude that the detonator in the device was an ICI "L" series electric delay detonator, numbered 15 within the series (Exhibit C.104b, p.27).

8.9 Thomas postulated that since they found no fragments attributable to an arming switch, the device was probably armed by joining loose wires together and then concealing those wires within the pack (Exhibit C.104b, p.32). In this way, a simple electrical circuit could have been established, using power from the battery, which would initiate the explosion once the "Postpak" was opened. As the circuit was closed, a current would have reached an electric "match head" inside the detonator, which would then burn a chemical delay compound, which in turn would ignite the explosive compound in the detonator itself, which then would have detonated the bulk charge (T.366).

8.10 The composition of the device

The device consisted of both incendiary and explosive components. The incendiary material was outside the Zippy Box which contained the explosive material. The two substances were not mixed. An analysis of samples taken from the scene by forensic scientists, led by Dr. Hilton Kobus, confirmed that the incendiary component contained red phosphorus, calcium and sulphur (probably in the form of calcium sulphate or "Plaster of Paris"), and vegetable oil, the type of which could not be identified despite extensive efforts (see the evidence of Dr. Kobus at T.429-431, and Dr. Pigou at T.327).

8.11 Mr. J.D. Kelleher, of the Victorian Police Forensic Science Centre, an acknowledged expert on explosives, was asked to assist. He thought that the mixture in the incendiary device was "extremely unusual" (T.287). It was similar to the composition found in some marine markers, but none could be found with the particular proportions found in this device (T.287).

8.12 The investigators found no residue from the explosive material at the scene. Thomas told me that the damage was consistent with a very small quantity of high explosive (T.362). Kelleher told me that the absence of residue found at the scene made it impossible to specifically identify the type of explosive material used, although it was possible to conclude that there were four substances with the requisite properties, none of which leave a residue. He reasoned that PETN (pentaerythritol tetranitrate) was the most likely, since it is much more commonly available. The others are used either in military or specialised commercial situations (T.281). PETN is found in commercial "detonating cord", one type of which is known as "ERT cord", or Cordex. A sample of this type of cord was found at the premises of Allan Chamberlain at Wynn Vale during a search on 25 May 1994. I will discuss that issue in more detail later.

8.13 Thomas told me that, after conducting a number of test explosions, they were able to establish that approximately 35 grams of PETN would have been used (T.365).

8.14 An alternative possibility is that either C-4 or Semtex, which could have been made using recipes in the Palladin Press magazines, was the explosive material used. Mr. Kelleher did not rule out either substance (T.299-300). C-4 and Semtex contain a mixture of some of the four substances referred to above, and would not have been expected to leave a residue (T.300).

8.15 How the parcel was posted

The investigation soon established that the package had been posted at the Modbury North Post Office, 436 Montacute Road, Modbury North, on Monday 28 February or Tuesday 1 March 1994 (see the statement of Ms. Harris, Exhibit C.3a, p1). The package was noticed at the Adelaide Mail Centre on Tuesday 1 March 1994 (statement of Mr. Mill, Exhibit C.4a, p2). Mr. Stone’s evidence that he collected the parcel at about 7.30a.m. on Wednesday 2 March 1994 was confirmed by Ms. Ward (Exhibit C.5a, p2).

8.16 Search of Perre’s premises

Swan told me that the investigators were provided with a list of suspects by the NCA (T.3639). There were about a dozen on the list, one of whom was Domenic Perre. A task force of about forty officers was assembled on the evening of 2 March 1994, split up into teams, given an address of a suspect and instructed to attend, speak to the person involved, make an assessment of the situation and, if considered necessary, arrange for a search of the premises (T.3640). Swan acknowledged that the fact that Presgrave and Stapleton were assigned to attend at Perre’s address was an indication that Perre was already considered the primary suspect (T.3641). Swan told me that it was left to the discretion of the individual team leaders to decide whether technical officers would conduct the search and whether a full crime scene examination, involving vacuuming and tape-lifts and the like, was warranted (T.3642).

8.17 Stapleton told me that prior to the search they received a briefing, at which they were given information which had already been established by the technicians. In particular, they were advised that chemicals such as sulphur, red phosphorus, chlorine, acid, ammonium nitrate, and the like, could be involved and that components such as wires, batteries, pegs, switches, detonators and even mouse-traps could be involved. In particular, it was clear that the investigators were aware that red phosphorus was involved from the very beginning (T.3733). However, it is significant that the detectives were not told at that stage that vegetable oil was a component in the bomb (T.3734).

8.18 At about 7.35p.m. Presgrave, Stapleton, Loechel and others attended at Perre’s address and conducted a search and seized various chemicals and electrical equipment and other general equipment, which was closely analysed (see the statement of Loechel, Exhibit C.39, p2-3). Photographs taken during the search disclosed the presence of a container of what appears to be "Celestial" brand vegetable oil, but this was not seized as the detectives had not been instructed to look for oil. This may be a red herring, since "Celestial" oil was tested later, and found not to be consistent with the oil used in the device (see the evidence of Dr. Pigou, T.328).

8.19 One article which was located and seized during the search was a catalogue from the Ace Chemical Company (Exhibit C.139). The catalogue had been marked at various points. A number of the chemicals marked correspond with chemicals mentioned in the Palladin Press magazines "Home Made Semtex. C-4’s Ugly Sister", "Home Made C-4. A Recipe for Survival", and "Improvised Explosives. How to Make Your Own". For example, "Nitro Methane" is written on the catalogue, and Ammonium Nitrate is marked, and they are two of the three ingredients in "Home Made C-4". The third ingredient is a commonly available substance which need not be purchased from a chemical company. I have already mentioned Mr. Kelleher’s evidence (at T.300) that home-made C-4 could have been the explosive component in the bomb, since it does not leave a residue.

8.20 Although the search of Perre’s premises was conducted by technical services personnel, a detailed "crime scene" examination involving vacuuming and tape-lifting was not conducted (see the evidence of Presgrave at T.3823). This, at first glance, seems surprising since Perre was considered the primary suspect at the time. I was informed that usual practice in these matters is that a minute examination is not conducted unless there are indications of the presence of such evidence on macroscopic examination, as was clearly the case at Waymouth Street.

8.21 Mr. Illingworth, counsel for SAPOL, also reminded me that Perre told an undercover police officer in another context that the police had been looking in the wrong place in any event (see the evidence of Pahia at T.1110).

8.22 Detective Sergeant Presgrave told me that while they were present at Perre’s house, he asked Perre about the officer from the NCA who was involved in the charges brought against him, and that he mentioned the name Virginia Lynch. When he asked Perre whether she was the arresting or charging officer, he said "No", and added that he did not know the name of the person who charged him (T.3799). I find that this was a lie on Perre’s part. Bowen had identified himself to Mr. Waye during their telephone conversation on 6 September 1993, Bowen’s name was typed on the information (charge document), which was due to be heard in court the following day, and Perre used Bowen’s name to Detective Mitchell on 5 October 1993.

8.23 The presence of primer compound

One item seized during the search of Perre’s premises was a small plastic 35 millimetre photographic film container (item DP17). This container had a circular hole drilled in the lid, the size of which corresponded with the diameter of the detonator used in the bomb. The contents of the container were analysed, and were found to contain "primer compound", which is used in firearm ammunition. The hole in the film container was also consistent with it having been used as a receptacle for spent primer compound during the process of reloading ammunition. An ammunition reloader was found in the garage of Perre’s premises (see the statement of Constable Birch, Exhibit C.68b, p2). This became significant when particles of primer compound were found to be present on an adhesive tape stub which had been used to collect samples from Mr. Wallis’ desk, and on another stub used to take samples from his trousers.

8.24 Dr. Kobus explained what happened in a letter dated 28 May 1999 (Exhibit C.105c) as follows:-

"A plastic bottle (Item DP17) which was taken from Mr. Perre’s residence was received in our laboratory on 3 March 1994. The bottle contained black-coloured residues of unknown composition at this time. A sample was removed from this bottle on 4 March by taking scrapings. The sample was placed on an adhesive tape surface on a small scanning electron microscope (SEM) stub. Samples had been collected in a similar way from the desk at the scene of the explosion and from Mr. Wallis’ trousers.

 

Prior to examination in an SEM, samples are coated with carbon in a vacuum coater. The above sample was processed in the coater at the same time as the desk samples and the Wallis trousers sample. Analysis of the sample in the bottle showed it to be firearms primer residue. Primer residues are characterised by the presence of the elements lead, barium and antimony in the particles. Primer residue particles were also found on the sample from the desk and from Wallis’ trousers that were processed at the same time as the sample from DP17. Particles were not found on other samples from the desk and trousers.

 

In an interim report (dated 6 April 1994), the presence of the particles was stated. However, concern was expressed at the absence of particles on other samples and that this situation needed further evaluation. The interim report was provided as an early summary of results at that time and not as a definitive statement of conclusions.

 

...".

 

8.25 It is to be noted that the decision to arrest Domenic Perre on 11 March 1994 was based on a number of factors, one of which was the finding of particles of primer residue at the explosion scene and similar compounds found in an article seized from Perre’s garage (see the evidence of Stapleton at T.3733).

8.26 Dr. Kobus said that he was concerned that such a small number of particles of primer compound were found, and that if they had been involved in the explosion many more would have been discovered. He believed that the presence of primer compound on the tape-lifts was the result of cross-contamination (T.432). He pointed out that the particles were found on the very edge of the tape-lift and only in the first or second sample (T.433). His theory was that somebody from State Forensic Science had handled DP17, and the particle was transferred from his or her fingers to the tape stubs as they were being prepared for analysis.

8.27 It is interesting to note that in their initial report to police dated 6 April 1994, the theory that the explosive material could have been primer compound was postulated. The report (Exhibit C.105) states:-

"A plastic vial filled with primer material and surrounded by red phosphorus could possibly have been the heart of the explosive device. Work will continue to evaluate this possibility".

(p.4)

 

If the explosive device had been constructed in that way, I can see the force of Dr. Kobus’ argument that many more particles of residue could be expected to be found. However, there is an alternative theory. A film container such as DP17, containing a small amount of primer residue in the bottom, could have been filled with PETN, and a detonator inserted through the hole in the lid, and then used as part of the device. If this occurred, it would not be surprising that only a couple of particles might have been transferred.

8.28 In any event, further work was undertaken during April 1994, but no further particles of primer residue were discovered on any of the adhesive stubs. This led the scientists to the conclusion that the presence of the primer residue was a "spurious result" (T.2936). Dr. Kobus pointed out that:-

"The reason for doing all this extra work and evaluation of the primer particle results is that we are acutely aware of the difficulties associated with this type of analysis and are always extremely cautious of how the results are interpreted. Due to the complete absence of the particles on all other samples analysed and the unusual distribution of the particles on the tape we are certain that the results are spurious. The likely explanation is contamination from the sample from the bottle DP17. Residues were only found on samples handled at the same time as the sample taken from DP17".

(Exhibit C.105c, p2).

 

8.29 In my opinion, the issue of the primer residue has had an unsatisfactory effect on this investigation. Dr. Kobus acknowledged that the mixing of samples from the crime scene and from the suspect’s premises was inappropriate. He said:-

"I guess - if you are trying to say that wasn’t good practice, I agree with you. That shouldn’t have been done, yes. I would be happy with that".

(T.2937)

He told me that State Forensic Science now have a standard practice that samples from the source and samples from the suspect are received and analysed in different rooms in order to avoid cross-contamination (T.2940).

8.30 There is no way of establishing conclusively whether the presence of primer residue on the tape-lifts was an important piece of evidence which has been rendered nugatory by poor laboratory practice, or whether it was a spurious piece of evidence on which the police relied in good faith in making their decision to arrest Domenic Perre on 11 March 1994. Either way, the outcome has been unsatisfactory.

 

9. Information leading to the arrest of Domenic Perre

9.1 The role of Allan Chamberlain

Allan Chamberlain had worked as a gunsmith at Central Firearms on Prospect Road at Prospect for about two years prior to 2 March 1994. The business was owned by Stan Tettis. Staff at the shop included Barry Fowler (since deceased), Geoffrey Snook and Andrew Martin, who operated a part-time leather-work business from a shed at the rear of the premises.

9.2 The business had a number of regular patrons including Domenic Perre. A number of these people, including Perre, would call at the shop and chat to the people there and enjoy a cup of coffee as well as to transact business.

9.3 Chamberlain came to the notice of the police in relation to this investigation on 5 March 1994, when they were contacted by Mr. L.J. Richardson, a police investigator with the Royal Australian Air Force stationed in Canberra. He telephoned SAPOL on that day, and advised that he had received information which was of importance to the inquiry from a person named Marijan Kira.

9.4 The police contacted Kira on 6 March 1994. He told them that on Thursday 3 March 1994 he, Chamberlain and a man named Leon Marshall had gone to a friend of Kira’s for dinner. He told them that Chamberlain had been unusually quiet during the evening. At one stage he joined him on the back verandah, and Chamberlain told him that he was concerned that he might become implicated in the NCA bombing. He told him, in essence, that Domenic Perre had visited him some days earlier and asked him to look after certain articles, including detonators, fuses, literature concerning explosives and a bugging device (T.655).

9.5 Allan Chamberlain was interviewed on that day, 6 March 1994, and denied Kira’s allegations (see Exhibit C.137, p4).

9.6 While Chamberlain was being interviewed, police attended at the property at Wynn Vale, owned by his mother, where Chamberlain resided. After the interview was concluded, Chamberlain was conveyed back to Wynn Vale and, on arrival, saw a large contingent of police had arrived and were searching the property. At this juncture, Chamberlain approached Detective Sergeant Swan. Swan told him that Adam Perre had driven down his driveway in his white Commodore sedan earlier that evening, performed a U-turn and then left. Swan explained to Chamberlain that the STAR Force officers were present for that reason. Chamberlain then said:-

"Look, I wasn’t too truthful with Presgrave and Stapleton about the detonators and magazines and that, can I speak to them?".

(see Exhibit C.153, p2).

9.7 Chamberlain then conducted the police officers to a feed-shed in the horse stable area on the property, removed a number of floor-boards, and removed two large grey-coloured trunks, a black gun case and three sealed PVC cylinders. When these containers were opened, they contained an astonishing collection of firearms, including some extremely high-powered weapons, associated paraphernalia including large amounts of ammunition, and a number of other items of great interest to the inquiry. The firearms included automatic and semi-automatic rifles, pistols, shotguns and other equipment too various to mention. The weapons and associated equipment are listed in the statement of Constable Birch, Exhibit C.68a.

9.8 The photographs of the weapons and other equipment are Exhibit C.43b.

9.9 Chamberlain was interviewed again at the Holden Hill Police Station on 7 March 1994 (the record is Exhibit C.137a). He told police that:-

• Perre gave him the firearms found at Wynn Vale for safe-keeping in the latter half of 1993 (p.10-11);

 

• he also gave him a number of "Palladin Press" magazines, which I will describe shortly;

 

• he hid these goods under the floor-boards (p.6);

 

• about two or three weeks after he received them, Perre asked him for several of the magazines back, and that he returned those magazines to Perre within a couple of days (T.2478);

 

• on 1 March 1994, Perre came to Central Firearms and asked Chamberlain to hold some further articles for him. They were contained in a "Rabbit Photo" plastic bag and consisted of:-

. two magazines - "Home Made Semtex - C-4’s Ugly Sister" and "Improvised Explosives - How to Make Your Own";

 

. a length of blue fuse cord with a detonator attached;

 

. a film container containing eight fuse detonators;

 

. another plastic container containing two fuse detonators;

 

. a blue cloth containing two electric detonators (numbered 12 and 15, the latter being identical to the type used in the bomb);

 

. a "bugging" device.

(T.2469, Exhibit C.137a, p2-3)

9.10 Chamberlain told the police that Perre had given him the guns about four to five months previously (see Exhibit C.137a, p10-11). He later explained that he received the guns in instalments, the first before 30 September 1993 and the second after 3 October 1993 (see Exhibit C.137e, p1), and that the books came with the second instalment of guns (T.2459).

9.11 Chamberlain explained to police that he had decided to tell them what he knew because Perre had seen the police at the property and because "he knows I’m talking to you" (see Exhibit C.137a, p14).

9.12 On 8 March 1994 there was a further interview with Chamberlain concerning the books that were seized the previous evening. The books included the following titles:-

• "FM Bugs", "Bugging and its Preventions", "Learning Electronics Book 1", "More FM Bugs", "Fourteen FM Bugs to Build", all of which he identified as belonging to Marijan Kira and which he had received about six months earlier;

 

• "Improvised Explosives. How to Make Your Own", "Home Made Semtex. C-4’s Ugly Sister", "Home Made C-4. A Recipe for Survival", all of which he identified as belonging to Domenic Perre and which he said Perre returned to him the day before the bombing;

 

• "Zips, Pipes and Pens", "Breath of the Dragon. Home Built Flame Throwers", "Home Made Grenade Launchers. Constructing the Ultimate Hobby Weapon", "Expedient Hand Grenades", "Sneak it Through. Smuggling Made Easier", all of which he identified as belonging to Domenic Perre, but which he said were given to him about one to two months after he had received the guns from Perre (see Exhibit C.137b, p1-3).

 

9.13 Invoices from Palladin Press in the United States of America to Domenic Perre for several of the publications mentioned above and some associated correspondence from him (Exhibit C.150) establish that Perre purchased these magazines.

9.14 The evidence of Sergeant Greenlees, the SAPOL fingerprints expert, establishes that Perre’s fingerprint was positively identified on p.19 of the publication "Sneak it Through" (T.1225), and prints consistent with those of Perre were found on p.18 of "Sneak it Through", pp.30, 31 and 38 of "Home Made C-4", and on p.122 of "Home Made Grenade Launchers". Under more current standards for fingerprint evidence, several of these prints would be accepted as positive identification.

9.15 During this interview, Chamberlain also told the police that he had received four sticks of an explosive named "Riogel", which is actually gelignite. He told the police that he was at Central Firearms when he was called to the front counter and spoke to an Italian-looking male person, whom he described to the police. After a conversation with this man, whom he had never met before, he bought the sticks for $50.00, and sold them to Domenic Perre for $75.00 a couple of days later.

9.16 Chamberlain said that there was one occasion, in the latter half of 1993, when Perre asked him whether he knew of a timing device which would operate over a period longer than 24 hours (T.2487). He said that Perre also told him that he had conducted a test explosion of a device he had made, that it had not gone as well as he had planned, but that "he seemed pleased with the result" (T.2488). He said that Perre also described how he transferred a portion of the "product" he had made into a container, which he took to be a film canister, and that he described the consistency of the "product" as being something like that of peanut paste, and that he had to scoop it out (T.2489). He said that Perre described how he had taken the device to a quarry or something similar, and that he had waited for it to go off and that it had not gone off as he had expected (T.2493). He said that he was "quite busy" at the time Perre came in, he was not concentrating closely on what Perre was saying, and that he was "effectively in the road" (T.2488).

9.17 I have already mentioned that the micro-switch which the technicians established was used in the device, could be purchased at Dick Smith Electronics and from Force Electronics. The Zippy Box could only be purchased from Dick Smith Electronics. Domenic Perre was identified by two witnesses as being a customer at Dick Smith Electronics. Mr. M. Burt, who worked at the Enfield store, recognised Perre as a regular customer (T.1530), and said that on one occasion he had come to the shop asking about a micro-switch and "whether you could have a lid put on top of it and if you took the lid off it would activate the switch". He said that he went over to the box section and was "mucking around with the box and the lid" (T.1531). This all happened in about January 1994 (Exhibit C.126a, p2). Mr. Burt also said that Perre inquired about timing devices on the same day (T.1532).

9.18 Perre was also identified by another shop assistant at the Enfield store, Ms. Ashfield. In her affidavit (Exhibit C.55a, p3), she described how Perre came to the store and asked her about 12 volt timer kits. She told him that they only had 240 volt ones. Ms. Ashfield was very clear in her identification of Perre.

9.19 Surveillance

As part of Operation Cerberus, and in particular an off-shoot of that operation code-named Vulpino, Domenic Perre was under surveillance for various periods during the early part of 1994. Although the records produced by the NCA establish that surveillance officers were on duty on Tuesday 1 March 1994, those records do not confirm that Domenic Perre was the subject of that surveillance. The diary of Ms. A (name suppressed) reveals that she was "surveilling at Salisbury" (T.3473) but she could find no running sheet detailing that surveillance for 1 March 1994 (T.3476). The diary of Mr. B (name suppressed) reveals that he was on duty that day but he has no record of surveilling anybody (T.3384). The diary of Mr. C (name suppressed) reveals that he was engaged on Operation Vulpino on 1 March 1994, although he is unable to explain why there is no running sheet for that day (T.3486). The vagueness of these records is surprising. Only 24 hours later, Sergeant Bowen was dead, and Perre was the principal suspect. One might have expected that these officers would have been asked about Perre’s movements on the day before the bombing. I find it surprising that this has not been done before now.

9.20 When taken in combination, this evidence leads me to conclude that Perre was being surveilled at some time on that day. However, there is no evidence to shed any light on Perre’s activities that day and, in particular, none to confirm or contradict Chamberlain’s evidence that he met with Perre on 1 March and received the fuse cord, detonators, etc. for safe-keeping.

9.21 Surveillance of Perre on 2 March 1994

Surveillance of Perre continued the following day. This revealed:-

• 8.00a.m. - surveillance commenced;

• 8.40a.m. - Perre left home address;

• 8.45a.m. - Perre returned to home address;

• 9.15a.m. - Perre left home address again - followed to 44 Salisbury Highway, Salisbury;

 

• 9.25a.m. - Perre driven in another vehicle to McLeod Tyre and Brake Service at Salisbury where contact was broken (all agents were immediately recalled following the bombing for a briefing);

 

• 11.05a.m. - Perre seen driving his car to the vicinity of Central Firearms at Prospect;

 

• 11.50a.m. - Perre drove vehicle to the rear of Red Cross Building, 211 Childers Street, North Adelaide and returned a baby capsule;

 

• 12.15p.m. - Perre drove vehicle to Grote Street, where he parked outside Hubbards and went into the store;

 

• 12.27p.m. - Perre drove vehicle to the Pitt Street car park, where he parked on the roof (photographs taken from this position demonstrate that damage to the CPS Credit Union building was visible from this position - see Exhibit C.28a, photographs KMN1-16). It was also noted that there were a number of vacant spaces in the car park lower than on the top floor (see Exhibit C.34a, p2);

 

• 12.35p.m. - Perre left the car park on foot to the area of the General Post Office where he appeared to stop and look at the ambulances, etc;

 

• the affidavit of Constable Hunt establishes that Perre was in Bentham Place and approached Constable Hunt, asking what happened. He was seen to have twice walked from corner to corner, crossing Bentham Street (Exhibit C.30a, p2).

 

• at 1.20p.m. Perre was observed to return to his vehicle and drive to the vicinity of Sam’s International Coffee Lounge in Jervois Street, Torrensville. The evidence establishes that the coffee lounge is owned by Sam Catanzariti, a colleague of Perre’s;

 

• at 1.50p.m. Perre returned to his vehicle and drove to 33 Northcote Street, Torrensville, the home of his cousin Mr. Ben Battiste and his wife. I will deal with what occurred at this address shortly;

 

• at 2.25p.m. Perre then drove back to the vicinity of Central Firearms, where he remained for fifteen minutes or so;

 

• at 2.51p.m. he was seen to drive his vehicle to Curnow Road, Waterloo Corner;

 

• at 3.35p.m. he then drove to premises on Linden Road, McDonald Park;

 

• at 3.55p.m. he drove to the premises of OPSM at Wiltshire Street, Salisbury;

 

• at 4.29p.m. he then drove to 12 Sabina Street, Salisbury;

• at 4.34p.m. he then drove to his home address.

Surveillance continued until 7.45p.m. that night, during which Perre made several further trips. A summary of this surveillance is contained in the NCA Surveillance Report, Exhibit C.145.

9.22 It will be seen from the surveillance reports that Perre spent some time looking at where the bomb had exploded, while on foot in the area, and also drove to a vantage point on the roof of the Pitt Street car park from where he could have been surveying the damage. However, it is clear that this was three hours or so after the explosion took place.

9.23 The hidden briefcase - Role of Benedict Battiste

The surveillance officers noted that at 1.53p.m. on 2 March 1994 Perre attended at 33 Northcote Street, Torrensville, the house of his cousin Benedict Battiste. Shortly after Perre arrived, a white vehicle also arrived and parked behind Perre’s vehicle and a male person alighted and walked into the driveway. This male person was Benedict Battiste. At about 2.25p.m. Perre and Battiste came out from the house and went to Perre’s vehicle and Battiste then returned to the house carrying a black briefcase (see Exhibit C.31a, p2).

9.24 When Battiste gave evidence, he said that Perre had asked him to keep the briefcase as it contained "personal papers". He explained that he "might be raided" and that he did not want to have those papers at home (T.1903). When Battiste was interviewed by Detective McIntyre on the evening of 11 March 1994 (the day Perre was arrested), he confirmed that Perre had been at his house at around 2.00p.m. on 2 March. He mentioned a conversation they had about the NCA bombing, but at no stage did Battiste mention to McIntyre that he had taken possession of the briefcase (see Exhibit C.131). Battiste said that he did not mention the briefcase to McIntyre because "he didn’t ask" (T.1905). He said that he did not believe he was under an obligation to disclose the fact that he had the briefcase (T.1909), even though he was aware that it held Perre’s passport, two bank passbooks, and a couple of taxation papers (T.1915). He acknowledged that McIntyre asked him why Perre visited him on 2 March, but he did not tell McIntyre about the briefcase because

"I didn’t think the contents of the briefcase were significant".

(T.1926).

 

Battiste was then in difficulty explaining why, if the contents were not significant, he took steps to hide it in a trunk in his kitchen (T.1936). All he could come up with was that it was "none of their business" (T.1926).

9.25 Battiste acknowledged that the briefcase also contained Perre’s international driver’s licence, his birth certificate, his marriage certificate, the baptismal certificates for his children, and bank passbooks for the children (T.1936).

9.26 Battiste’s evidence is so startlingly illogical that I do not accept it. He is an intelligent man who has a degree in law. I conclude that he knew very well that the contents of Mr. Perre’s briefcase were significant, and I have no hesitation in concluding that he consciously withheld the information from Detective McIntyre, and that his evidence to me was disingenuous. Perhaps it is of significance that Battiste owed Perre $7,500.00, and as at 1994 had not repaid it (T.1960).

9.27 The existence of the briefcase did not become apparent until 25 March 1994 at a hearing of the NCA, at which Battiste gave evidence and, when questioned about the briefcase which had been seen by the surveillance officer, disclosed its existence. The briefcase was seized that day.

9.28 In my opinion, the nature of the contents of the briefcase indicate that Perre placed it with Battiste for safe-keeping, in contemplation of the need to leave the country quickly. Certainly, the issue is one which calls for an explanation, which has not been forthcoming from Perre.

9.29 The Tettis letter

On 13 April 1994, a letter, which had been found in Perre’s cell, was brought to the attention of Correctional Officer Daniel Wright at G Division, Yatala Labour Prison, by a subordinate officer. After Wright brought it to the attention of his supervisor, he photostated the letter and then returned it to the place where it was found in Perre’s cell (see Exhibit C.113). He acknowledged that it was contained within a Spirax notebook, although he was unable to recall whether it had the words "legally privileged, Peter Waye" on the front, as suggested to him by Perre in cross-examination (T.886).

9.30 The photocopy of the letter, identified by Wright, is Exhibit C.111. The letter is addressed to "Dear Stan". The author begins by protesting his innocence in the strongest terms. He then refers to the "lies that Allan is telling them to avoid prosecution for things that he is responsible for ...", a clear reference to Allan Chamberlain. He then argues, along the same lines as Carbone did in court, that Chamberlain was trying to get rid of him, and that he could "keep my guns and turn me in for the reward". The letter then states, somewhat mystifyingly:-

"The fact is that the police believe that the bomb was mailed at Modbury Post Office but he has slipped up and we know that he mailed it on TUE 1ST OF MARCH EVENING at the North Adelaide POST OFFICE IN TYNTE OR WARD STREET".

 

As I have already mentioned, the evidence is clear that the package containing the bomb was posted at the Modbury North Post Office. The purpose of the reference to the North Adelaide Post Office is not clear.

9.31 The real purpose of the letter then becomes clear. It states:-

"What I want you to do is to make a statement that he told you where and when he mailed it and that he tried to involve you by promising you some of the guns and share of the reward if you also tell the police that you saw him give me explosives. If you make this statement you will have to make sure that your conversation with him was on a day after the bomb. Try to remember if he was in any day from Wed 2^nd the day of the bomb and if not state that he rang you at home about midnight on Wed 2^nd and he told you this and you don’t know where he called from, he was drunk and made threats to implicate you as well. If you are asked why you did not tell about this before tell them about been (sic) worried of getting involved after the police told you not to make statements to anyone else under threat to your business".

 

9.32 The letter concluded with the exhortation:-

"Don’t be afraid, cooperate you will be doing the right thing and I will look after you as my brother and my lawyer will help you any time. He did it and I will surely die in jail if you my friend do not help, please if you believe in God and Jesus help me this man is evil. Your friend DOMENIC - GOD BLESS YOU".

 

9.33 The handwriting in the photocopy letter was analysed and it was established that it had been written by Domenic Perre (see the statement of Glyn Baker Smith, Exhibit C.51b, p2).

9.34 Stephen Sunk said that in March/April/May 1994 he received a letter in his letter box. "Steve give to Stan" was written on the envelope. He said the envelope did not have a stamp on it. He delivered it to Stan Tettis without opening it (T.767).

9.35 Sunk said that he was with Stan Tettis when he opened the letter and read it. He said that he had a look at it but did not get a chance to "really read it". All he could remember was the "God bless you" at the end (T.768). He said "Basically we believed it was from Domenic Perre" and that he said to Tettis "You have got to - if you can help, help Domenic and help the police", but that Tettis said "I know nothing" and tore up the letter (T.768). This evidence indicates to me that Sunk had a good understanding of the contents of the letter.

9.36 Tettis confirmed that he received such a letter from Sunk in July or August 1994, before the committal proceedings. Tettis said that he "didn’t really read" the letter either, that Sunk said "Don’t have anything to do with it", and that out of anger he grabbed the letter, threw it on the ground and went outside and had a cigarette (T.1465).

9.37 Mr. Caldicott submitted that I could not be satisfied that Exhibit C.111 was a copy of the letter received by Sunk and delivered to Tettis. Neither man read it right through, and neither could specifically identify Exhibit C.111 as the letter they saw. Sunk purported to identify it to the police in his statement (Exhibit C.110a). Quite frankly, I do not believe either Sunk or Tettis when they say they did not read the letter. The very clear view I formed from the evidence, and their demeanour when giving it, is that they both read the letter and were aware of its contents, and that was the reason for Tettis’ angry response. I have no doubt whatsoever that the letter received by Stan Tettis was the original of Exhibit C.111.

9.38 The letter itself is curious, since it asks Tettis to make a statement to the police falsely claiming that Chamberlain confessed to mailing the bomb, and that Chamberlain tried to involve Tettis by asking him to falsely tell the police that he had seen Chamberlain give Perre explosives, and to give the police a false statement about why he had not told them this earlier. This amounts to a complicated and devious disinformation campaign, designed to confuse and mislead the police.

9.39 The main significance of the letter is whether it demonstrates that Perre had a consciousness of his own guilt. There is clear authority for the proposition that such a conclusion should not be reached, unless the court is satisfied to the requisite standard that there is no other explanation, consistent with innocence, as to why he would do such a thing (see R v Power (1996) A Crim R at 407, Woon v R (1914) 109 CLR 529, Harris v R (1990) 55 SASR 321, R v Erdei [1998] 2 VR 606, R v Bridgman (1980) 24 SASR 278 and R v Watt (1905) 20 Cox CC 852, Moriarty v London Chatham and Dover Railway Co (1870) LR 5 QB 314, Andrews and Hurst, Criminal Evidence (2^nd Edition), para. 9-59). I am unable to suggest an alternative explanation. True it is that Perre protests his own innocence in the letter, but, in my view, that was to curry favour with Tettis. He realised, I am sure, that Tettis would not have dreamed of helping him if Tettis thought he was guilty of the bombing. Such a blatant attempt to "frame" Chamberlain, and mislead the police, could only have been motivated by consciousness of his own guilt.

9.40 Operations Arba and Zoom

Operation Arba was the continuation of the investigation into the NCA bombing after the nolle prosequi was entered in the criminal charges against Perre. Presgrave explained:-

"(it was) an infiltration process whereby (a covert unit in Victoria) believed they could assist us by infiltrating into Mr. Perre’s organisation and perhaps obtaining this line of inquiry to link Mr. Perre to the bombing, if he was responsible. That particular undercover started in, I think, June or July of ‘95, ... it is what they called a cold start, whereby an undercover was introduced via a person that knew Mr. Perre, and that person was Frank Carbone, and it was a slow infiltration process that was proceeding over the months".

(T.3813-4).

9.41 While that infiltration process was in its early stages, the SAPOL investigators were approached by the Drug Task Force and advised that they had received some information from an informant who had been approached by Perre and others to become involved in an amphetamine factory. A meeting then ensued, Operation Arba was scaled back, and the Drug Squad commenced a new operation, which they code-named Zoom.

9.42 Without descending into great detail, an undercover operative, who assumed the name Jack Pahia, made contact with Perre, and he was later joined in the operation by another undercover operative, who assumed the name Jimmy Anderson. Together, and with Perre, Sam Catanzariti and others, they made a number of preparations to set up an amphetamine factory on the property of the Trimboli family at Angle Vale.

9.43 Operation Zoom eventually culminated in a raid on the property on 4 January 1996 when Perre, Catanzariti and others were arrested. Frank Carbone was arrested at another location. Eventually, a plea bargain was entered into whereby Perre pleaded guilty to the charge and received a lengthy sentence of imprisonment, which he is still serving. The charges were not proceeded with against the others.

9.44 I received detailed evidence from Anderson and Pahia about their actions during Operation Zoom, and it is clear that Perre and Carbone were competent and sophisticated in their methods, particularly in the areas of surveillance and intelligence. For example, it was obvious to Pahia and Anderson that they were under surveillance from Carbone and his operatives during the operation (T.1056-7). At one stage, for example, Pahia and Anderson became aware that their room at a city motel had been searched (T.1196). They were aware of Perre’s background (T.1190). However, they continued to be involved in the operation, and recorded a number of conversations with Perre by using recording equipment hidden on their bodies. Transcripts were made from these recordings and some were tendered and form Exhibits C.115a-c and C.116a and b. I accept these transcripts as a true and accurate record of the conversations which took place.

9.45 I pause here to observe that, in my opinion, the courage of officers such as Anderson and Pahia should be recognized. They were obviously aware that their lives were at risk throughout this operation, and yet they persevered. I find such courage remarkable.

9.46 One of the methods by which amphetamine can be manufactured or "cooked" involves the use of red phosphorus. It is clear from the evidence of Anderson and Pahia, which I accept, that Perre was quite familiar with the substance and where he could obtain it. For example, Perre told Anderson:-

"There’s a few places to go. But you can try, the first place is a place called Ace Chemicals ... they’ve got some".

(Exhibit C.115b, p11).

However, he indicated that he was unable to purchase it himself. He said:-

"I would rather stick my dick in a chopping block, than go and ask for the red phosphorus ... the Police Department - that’s what they were looking for".

(Exhibit C.115b, p7).

When asked why he was reluctant, Pahia said that Perre pulled down his left eyelid with his left forefinger, and silently mouthed the word "bomb". Tony Trimboli said:-

"I know why, you don’t have to say it".

(Exhibit C.115b, p7).

9.47 A photograph of Perre was identified by Mr. Christopher Gayen, an employee of the Ace Chemical Company, as being a person who had attended on several occasions over a period of two or three years, the last occasion being two or three weeks before giving his statement (Exhibit C.59a) on 18 March 1994.

9.48 Perre gave an amount of cash to Frank Carbone, who then contacted Dominic Morabito (who was also an undercover operative, and who had already befriended Carbone in the course of Operation Arba) and told him he needed red phosphorus as soon as possible and that he needed as much as he could get as "these guys will be cooking tons of it" (T.1056).

9.49 On another occasion Perre said:-

"I have been reading a lot of magazines and books about chemicals the last couple of years so I know what I’m talking about ... I’ve studied up on these chemicals and I know they can be dangerous. Everything will be OK Jack".

(T.1087, Exhibit C.115, p2)

9.50 On yet another occasion, on 3 January 1996, Perre made the following comment in regard to the police investigation:-

"They were all fucking looking in the wrong place. It might be to fucking do with me. At least if they looked in the right place they might find something, instead of pissing me around".

(Exhibit C.115c, p6)

 

Later in the conversation, Perre described Sergeant Bowen as "a piece of shit" and said:-

"It’s just that I had something to do with him before when he came in and trashed my place and arrested me but I wouldn’t know one from the other, you know ... because what they had done, believe me, I was upset. Sure I wasn’t fucking happy ... down the track they fucking annoyed me so much that I wish I had fucking done and taken out the whole fucking building, you know ... fuck them. The fucking bomb. I dream about it".

(Exhibit C.115c, p7)

 

9.51 Sam and Tony Trimboli, who were both present during these conversations, denied any knowledge of these matters. Sam Trimboli, for example, said he did not recognise the voices on the tape (T.1671) and did not see or hear Perre pull down his eyelid or mouth the word "bomb". Tony Trimboli was less clear, saying it was "too long ago to recall" (T.1692). He suggested that he was unable to recognise any of the voices on the tape as it was "very scratchy" (T.1703). He did not remember Perre pulling down his eyelid either, or mouthing the word "bomb" (T.1704). In particular, he would not acknowledge that it was he who said "I know why, you don’t have to say it" (T1706). He

said "I have never heard myself on tape - I don’t remember saying that", although he acknowledged that it "possibly may have been - I don’t know" (T.1706-7). I do not believe either Sam or Tony Trimboli about these matters. It is perfectly obvious to me that the voices were Perre’s and Tony Trimboli’s on the tape. I regard Trimboli’s denials as deliberately false.

9.52 Anna Cirrito

Anna Cirrito, also known as Anna Cara, first came to the attention of the police in relation to this investigation on 3 June 1997, when she was arrested by Detective Sergeant Lockwood and Detective Foenander on an interstate warrant for fraud offences. Cirrito soon realised that the police had received information from Tony Romeo, whom she described as a former fiance. Romeo was a friend and colleague of Domenic Perre and indeed had been one of the defendants to the charges arising out of the Hidden Valley drug investigation. Lockwood told me that Cirrito was "somewhat bitter" about Romeo’s role in her capture, and that she saw the opportunity to raise the subject of the NCA bombing in that context (T.3414).

9.53 The facts in relation to Cirrito’s involvement in these issues are also complicated, and it is not necessary to canvas them in intricate detail. It is sufficient to say that in the next few days following 3 June 1997, Cirrito gave a number of statements to the police in which she made a number of allegations about the bombing. In the first signed statement (Exhibit C.134), she made the following allegations:-

• her father had told her in mid 1994 that Tony was trying to obtain a passport as he thought the police were on to him in relation to the bombing (C.134, p4);

• Romeo had told her that "Perri did the bombing but the police are trying to pin it on me";

• since July 1995 Romeo pursued her, and after she left her husband she travelled to Adelaide and stayed with his parents at their house in Unley (p.6);

• in late September 1995 Romeo proposed to her and she accepted (p.7);

• on the same day, Romeo and a number of male members of his family, together with "Perri", went rabbit shooting and returned with rabbits which they skinned and cooked. As they were sitting around the table talking, she heard "Perri" say "The bastard cop was killed on his anniversary" (2 March was Sergeant and Mrs. Bowen’s wedding anniversary, a fact which was publicised in the Adelaide press);

• during the course of the same evening she heard "either Perri or Tony" say:-

"We can never be part of this because if anyone was to be part of it and the cops did get anyone it would be Vottari as he made the bomb"

(p.8).

 

She was referring to Bruno Vottari, whom she knew was a heroin addict;

• she said that she heard "Perri" say to Tony:-

"He thought he could take what we worked so hard for away from us"

(p.8);

 

• Tony and "Perri" referred to the amphetamine factory that they were involved in, discussing how much they would make from the sale of drugs, and that she heard ‘Perri" say:-

"I am going to take my family and move to southern Italy. With that sort of money I can live like a king"

(p.9);

 

• she attempted to defraud her employer of a large amount of money in order to pay a large drug debt Tony Romeo owed to another person (p.12);

 

• at a party in December 1995 she overheard Tony saying to "Perri":-

"If anyone would go down for the bombing Vottari would because he made and organised the delivery of it";

(p.13)

 

• around Christmas 1995 she and Romeo signed a contract for the purchase of a house at Strathalbyn (which Romeo denied but the contract bearing his name and what purports to be his signature was produced and is part of Exhibit C.144);

• in February 1996 when she threatened to talk to the police during the course of an argument, Romeo pushed her out of a car and the driver’s side door was struck by an oncoming vehicle causing the door to hit her in the head causing an injury to her right eye (p.14).

 

9.54 Cirrito described "Perri" as "slim build, 40’s, dark hair, short, straight, 5’8" tall, Italian" (see Exhibit C.134, p13).

9.55 It was obviously extremely difficult for detectives to get the whole and complete story from Cirrito for the purpose of preparing a statement. She mentioned that she had kept detailed diary notes which recorded these events, and she led them on an extensive wild-goose chase in an attempt to locate it. For example, at one stage she said that the diary notes were with a friend of hers, Arthur Raftopoulos, who was then in London. Lockwood and Foenander made a number of telephone calls to Raftopoulos in London, who attended a bank in an attempt to locate them. Eventually, it transpired that the notes were secreted in Cirrito’s bedroom at her mother’s house at Airport West, a suburb of Melbourne. The notes were eventually obtained by the detectives, and are Exhibit C.134a (see the evidence of Foenander at T.2966).

9.56 Unfortunately, at no stage during their dealings with Cirrito did the detectives undertake a formal identification process of the man she described as "Perri" (evidence of Lockwood at T.3437). Lockwood said:-

"There was no doubt in my mind or her mind as to who it was we were referring to"

(see Lockwood’s evidence at T.3422).

 

He said that on 14 July 1997, Cirrito telephoned him from Melbourne and told him that she had seen Perre on the television news that night (T.3423). He confirmed that there had been coverage of the fact that Domenic Perre’s drug charges were before the Supreme Court of South Australia that day and that this had received television coverage that evening (see also Lockwood’s running sheets, Exhibit C.140).

9.57 When Cirrito gave evidence, she said that the person she referred to as "Perri" was not the same person as Domenic Perre, who was then present in court (T.2046). She said that she did not recall identifying Domenic Perre on the television as alleged by Lockwood (T.2132). It would have been better if the detectives had committed Cirrito to an identification at the time, so that such a "misunderstanding" might not have occurred later.

9.58 Cirrito insisted that what she wrote in her diary was the truth, and yet when she was asked about the references in her diary to a sexual relationship with Romeo she denied it, saying "I am not sure how that got there" (T.2074).

9.59 After Cirrito had completed her evidence, and following persistent questioning by Mr. Caldicott, counsel for Perre, it was discovered that the first conversation Lockwood and Foenander had with Cirrito in the Adelaide Police Station during the evening of 3 June 1997 had been video-taped. A good deal of confusion had existed as to what had happened to the record of that conversation, since Lockwood had been typing the conversation on to a computer, which had then been deleted due to a difficulty with the computer system (T.2963). Lockwood and Foenander travelled to Melbourne to type the "Declaration" (Exhibit C.134). It is a little difficult to understand why they did not prepare the declaration from the video-tape.

9.60 When the video-tape was eventually transcribed, there were a number of quite significant inconsistencies between what Cirrito said in that conversation and what appears in the declaration. For example, she described "Perri" as:-

"... he’s not very tall man. Um he’s quite slender in my eyes. Um his hair is very fine, it’s like sandy browny colour ... and he’s always seems to wearing a white long-sleeved shirt. That’s what stuck in my mind every time I saw him, he seemed to have the same shirt on ... mid-30’s, early 40’s ... Italian, southern Italian".

(Exhibit C.140b, p90).

9.61 Unfortunately, by the time this video-tape was located, Cirrito’s evidence had been so discredited that there was little point in recalling her for the purpose of putting these discrepancies to her.

9.62 Cirrito also alleged that she gave the statement to the police because they had "enticed" it out of her (T.2123), and that they had told her that she would be paid $70,000.00 as part of a witness protection programme, so that her mother’s mortgage could be paid off and she could get out of financial difficulty (T.2122). Lockwood and Foenander denied that they enticed the information out of her, countering that it was she who volunteered it to them because she was angry with Romeo, and that they had no idea that she knew anything about the case until she raised it (T.2962). They denied that they had promised her $70,000.00, although they confirmed that the subject was discussed on the basis that if she cooperated fully, and was truthful, there was a possibility that that sort of money could be paid, but that there were no guarantees, and that "I would have to refer it to the hierarchy within the department" (Lockwood T.3421).

9.63 There is no way of determining where the truth lies in relation to Cirrito’s allegations. Her evidence was unsatisfactory and riddled with inconsistencies. Since she had never formally identified Perre or "Perri" from a photograph or otherwise, she was able to deny that she was referring to the same person. In those circumstances, she seemed determined to separate herself from the entire issue and to render her evidence valueless. Whatever her motivation for this, the basic situation is that her evidence adds nothing to the inquiry.

9.64 Raymond Loveridge

Raymond Loveridge was a prisoner at Yatala Labour Prison at the same time Perre was there on remand on the murder charge. He was in the same division for a substantial period. Loveridge initially approached members of the Elizabeth Criminal Investigation Branch, saying he had information about the NCA bombing. He was referred to Presgrave and Stapleton. He alleged to police that Perre had made a number of statements to him, in which he told Loveridge what had occurred in relation to the bombing. At one stage, he allegedly admitted to Loveridge that he was responsible. Loveridge gave detailed information to the police, which resulted in extensive inquiries being conducted in South Australia, New South Wales and Victoria, in an attempt to substantiate these allegations. Some of the allegations were substantiated but a number were not (see the evidence of Swan at T.3654).

9.65 Loveridge was extradited back to the United Kingdom on fraud charges in June 1994, prior to the committal proceedings. It is pertinent to note that Loveridge did not seek any assistance from the police, either in relation to avoiding extradition to the U.K. or in relation to any other matter (T.3802), prior to his extradition.

9.66 Presgrave kept in touch with Loveridge after he returned to England and, while Presgrave was in England on other business in early July 1999, Loveridge agreed, through his solicitor, to give evidence to the inquiry via a video-link to Adelaide. He refused to travel to Adelaide to give evidence, and obviously there were no means to compel him to do so. To honour his commitment to give evidence, and since his credibility was obviously central to the inquiry, it was decided that Counsel Assisting and I would travel to England to hear Loveridge’s evidence.

9.67 Unfortunately Loveridge retreated from his earlier agreement and, through his solicitor, refused to give evidence in London. His motivation for this change of heart was not clear, and since I have received no formal evidence on this topic, it is inappropriate to speculate as to his reasons.

9.68 Certainly, so far as this inquiry is concerned, I have not received his statements into evidence and I will pay no regard to them in reaching my findings. As far as I could ascertain, there was no power to compel Loveridge to give evidence while he remained resident in the United Kingdom. Certainly the Coroners Act, 1975 (S.A.) does not purport to have extra-territorial operation in relation to the compellability of witnesses. Section 59E of the Evidence Act 1929 (S.A.), which authorises the taking of evidence outside the State, only applies to civil or criminal proceedings (see Section 59D). It was not possible, in view of that, to request an English coroner to take the evidence for me.

 

9.69 Section 25 of the Victorian Coroners Act entitles the State Coroner to use any of his powers under that Act to "help a coroner of another State or Territory to investigate a death". In my opinion, such a provision would be a useful addition to the South Australian Coroners Act, and could be extended to helping coroners from Commonwealth countries. My inquiries with Her Majesty’s Coroner for Inner West London revealed that he had no power to assist me by requiring Loveridge to give evidence before him, since there is no English equivalent of that section.

 

10. Allan Chamberlain’s credibility

10.1 Mr. Caldicott, counsel for Mr. Perre, attacked Mr. Chamberlain’s credibility, arguing that there was more evidence that Chamberlain was involved in the bombing than there was against Perre.

10.2 Lies to Police

In order to counteract the evidence against Perre in the Tettis letter, Mr. Caldicott suggested that Chamberlain was also guilty of telling lies, particularly to the police, and that such lies may have been prompted by a consciousness of guilt.

10.3 It was not until Chamberlain realised that Perre had been to his property during the evening of 6 March 1994, and that the police STAR Division officers were there to afford the searchers some protection, that he decided to tell the police the truth. He admitted this (T.2567). Even after he had given the statement to Presgrave and Stapleton on 7 March 1994 he held some information back, in particular the fact that he had received detonators and Riogel from sources other than Perre.

10.4 Chamberlain initially denied to police that he planned to go into business with Perre converting semi-automatic weapons into automatic weapons. He later admitted that this denial was untrue (T.2649). Chamberlain also failed to make his allegation about Perre conducting test explosions until one of the later interviews.

10.5 The way in which the allegations against Perre emerged from Chamberlain must be regarded as less than satisfactory. This was acknowledged by Stapleton, when he said that Chamberlain was "still somewhat selective in what he told us" (T.3762). This was both unhelpful to the police and to Chamberlain’s own credibility.

10.6 However, the evidence, in my opinion, falls a long way short of allowing the conclusion that Chamberlain was telling lies out of a consciousness of being involved in the bombing. They may have been told out of a consciousness of guilt, in the sense that he was conscious that he was in possession of illegal firearms and explosives and other evidence which he may have felt would wrongly implicate him in the investigation. This is a different thing from a consciousness that he was guilty of the bombing itself.

10.7 Attempts to conceal evidence

In another example of where Chamberlain was less than frank with the police, he telephoned Stan Tettis at his home in the early morning of Monday 7 March 1994 and warned him that the police were likely to come and search the shop premises. He suggested Tettis should get rid of a number of embarrassing articles at the shop, including a box containing the equipment he was using to convert rifles to fully automatic, and some illegal firearms (T.2873). Tettis said that by the time he got to work that day, the police were already there, and he did not act upon Chamberlain’s request (T.1460).

10.8 In my opinion, this evidence, like that described in the last section, confirms that Chamberlain was willing to be selective with the truth when dealing with the police, but that his actions arose from a consciousness that he may have been guilty of certain firearms offences, rather than a consciousness that he was involved in the bombing.

 

10.9 Knowledge of explosives

Allan Chamberlain had a nickname of "Gadget", reflecting the fact that he appears to have had a rather morbid fascination with all things technical and electronic, particularly if they involved firearms, explosives, bugging devices and the like. He worked as a gunsmith at Central Firearms, and also conducted small businesses on the side, importing and selling body armour, "mace", and other security equipment which he tried to sell to police and correctional services personnel. He also did business with Frank Carbone, supplying him on at least one occasion with "bugging devices" for use in his activities.

10.10 Chamberlain was also something of a braggart. Anyone who listens to the tape-recordings of his telephone conversations with Carbone (Exhibits C.135x) will have such an impression confirmed. In the words of Detective Stapleton, he "liked to brag and big-note himself" (T.3750).

10.11 Marijan Kira gave evidence that Chamberlain often liked to brag about the fact that he had access to a "virtual plethora of information of how to make explosives at home", and that he collected publications such as "The Anarchists Handbook" (T.658).

10.12 A fingerprint which was identified as Chamberlain’s was found in a book entitled "Home Made Semtex" (one of the books he alleged he received from Perre). The fingerprint was referred to in the evidence of Mr. Greenlees (T.1225).

10.13 In Chamberlain’s conversations with Carbone, he displays an apparently good general knowledge of explosives and bomb-making, and purports to give Carbone advice about how to conduct further inquiries into the technical aspects of how the bomb used at the NCA office may have been constructed (see Carbone’s evidence at T.2405-7).

10.14 Chamberlain did not deny that he had such knowledge, although he asserted that "any number of fourteen year old kids in school today have exactly the same basis of chemistry" (T.2554).

10.15 I have already outlined the fact that Chamberlain had in his possession a number of the magazines eventually found by the police on his property, most of which he said he received from Perre. He had possession of those magazines for a substantial period of time. He also said that he returned some of these magazines to Perre, who then returned them to him on the day before the bombing. Sergeant Thomas told me:-

"You can take all those various references, put them together and come up with this device".

(T.374).

 

Although the magazines are prohibited imports, the information is also available on the Internet (T.376).

10.16 This evidence shows that Chamberlain had the technical expertise to assemble a device such as that used in the NCA bombing. He did not seek to deny that fact. Mr. Caldicott submitted that he had greater expertise in this area than Perre did. I do not accept that, since we know nothing of Perre’s expertise in these matters. He declined to give evidence and be cross-examined. Perre’s fingerprints were found on a number of the magazines and, at one stage when he was cross-examining Jack Pahia, Perre referred to himself as a "gunsmith". (T.1190) The bewildering array of guns, ammunition and other equipment would suggest to me that Perre was no neophyte in technical matters.

 

10.17 Possession of explosives

Arthur Karras was a regular customer at Central Firearms, and Chamberlain was converting a Chinese "Mae Gun" to fully automatic for him. He said that he spent some time mining at Coober Pedy, and when he returned he had some "Cordex" detonating cord, some detonators and some fuse cord left over. He said he used some of the detonating cord for "fun", and he had no use for what was left because he had run out of detonators. In a conversation with Allan Chamberlain at Central Firearms, he mentioned that he had this Cordex, and Chamberlain expressed interest in it. He returned to the shop the same day and gave the Cordex to Chamberlain. He said he gave Chamberlain "about a metre" (T.831). Police found this Cordex on Chamberlain’s property on 25 May 1994, and it measured just over two metres (T.356).

10.18 Karras described how Chamberlain cut some of the cord open and poured the contents into an ashtray and tried to set it alight with a cigarette lighter, but nothing happened (T.831).

10.19 Chamberlain said that he received the Cordex from Karras before Perre asked him to store his firearms and other equipment which, as I have already mentioned, was some time before 30 September 1993 (Exhibit C.137e, p1).

10.20 On Chamberlain’s evidence, he did nothing with the Cordex, and it was in the same condition when he gave it to police in May the following year.

10.21 In about December 1993, Chamberlain also received gelignite, known as "Riogel", from John Tetipis, a cousin of Arthur Karras (T.832 and statement of Tetipis, Exhibit C.94a). I have already mentioned that Chamberlain paid $50.00 for four sticks of Riogel, which he sold to Perre for $75.00 about three days later (T.2486).

10.22 The issue of Riogel is something of a red herring, since it is clear from the evidence of Sergeant Thomas and Mr. Kelleher that the explosives used in the bomb were not of that type. However, that is not the case with the Cordex, as the evidence is that Cordex is made up of PETN, as I have already explained, and this could have been the source of the explosive used in the bomb. However, it is clear from Thomas’ evidence that the particular type of Cordex in Chamberlain’s possession would have yielded only about 12 grams of PETN per metre, which meant that about three metres of cord would have been required to supply the 35 grams or so required for the bomb (T.365).

10.23 Finally, the other evidence that Chamberlain was in possession of explosives is that he was found in possession of a roll of blue "safety fuse" with a fuse detonator attached during the search of the Railex container on 6 March 1994. Chamberlain told police that this safety fuse was in the same "Rabbit Photo" bag that was given to him by Perre on 1 March, the day before the bombing (T.2469 and C.137a, p2-3). That bag also contained the magazines which Perre had retrieved from Chamberlain some weeks earlier and a number of detonators, both fuse and electric types.

10.24 The safety fuse cord is not detonating cord like Cordex. It is a different type of explosive altogether. It contains gunpowder and is used as a pyrotechnic device to initiate fuse detonators (see the evidence of Sergeant Thomas at T.355). Accordingly, it, too, is irrelevant to the manufacture of the bomb which exploded at the NCA office and may well constitute another red herring.

 

10.25 Possession of micro-switches

Petros Maroudas, a friend of Arthur Karras who accompanied him on a number of visits to Central Firearms, alleged that he saw Chamberlain in possession of a micro-switch. He was initially vague about the switch, and then drew a diagram of it (T.913 - Exhibit C.114c). The micro-switch drawn by Maroudas was remarkably like the one depicted in photograph 192 of Exhibit C.104e, which was identified as being identical to the one used in the bomb. Karras said that the one in the photograph is not like the one he saw, and that he did not remember any levers protruding from it (T.875).

10.26 Chamberlain admitted that he purchased a micro-switch at one stage, explaining that he was using it to develop a communication system to use when he went shooting with Marshall (T.2507).

10.27 Possession of detonators

Alan Speck said that he gave eight fuse detonators (not electric) to Allan Chamberlain on 23 February 1994 (Exhibit C.66a, p3 and C.66b) because "I thought he would be interested in having them". Chamberlain admitted that he received these detonators from Speck (T.2501).

10.28 In a statement to police dated 30 July 1994 Robert Eagles alleged that he gave six electric detonators to Allan Chamberlain "about five or six weeks before the NCA bombing" (Exhibit C.162a, p5). Eagles alleged that he had buried them in a hole in a vacant lot in Melbourne and had dug them up and taken them to Adelaide for Chamberlain. He said that he retrieved three more similar detonators from the same hole at the request of Frank Carbone, and gave them to him in Melbourne on 19 June 1994. Carbone later produced these detonators to police.

10.29 Chamberlain denied that Eagles had given him any electric detonators (T.2496).

10.30 Eagles declined to answer any questions about the supply of detonators to Chamberlain on the grounds that it may incriminate him (T.1805). In particular, Eagles did not identify the detonator produced by Carbone as being the type he gave Chamberlain. In those circumstances, I can give no credence to the allegations in Eagles’ statement. In any event, the photographs of the detonators produced by Carbone (Exhibit C.135b) demonstrate that the detonators were not the same as the one used in the bomb.

10.31 Evidence of bomb-making

Stephen Sunk, another regular customer at Central Firearms and a friend of Stan Tettis and Domenic Perre, said that he had been told by Andrew Martin that he and Leon Marshall saw Allan Chamberlain making the bomb at the back of the shop. Sunk alleged that he asked Martin why he did not tell the police and that Martin said "The police have given me enough trouble, I’m not telling them anything" (T.771). Martin confirmed that he saw three Zippy Boxes in Chamberlain’s work area earlier in the piece, and saw one box in the same area a week before the bombing (T.1324). In an interview with Frank Carbone on 10 October 1994 (Exhibit C.124f) Martin said:-

"A. I just saw him playing with that black box, and it didn’t click until way after that obviously that’s what Barry saw so I saw the same thing. I just didn’t realise what it was, as far as I was concerned it was a black box.

 

Q. When you say black box what did you see though?

 

A. The Zippy Box, one of the Zippy Boxes on the bench and he was working on it.

 

Q. When you say he was working, what do you mean.

 

A. I don’t know he was just playing with this black box, I didn’t see what was in it, that’s why I didn’t know what it was.

 

Q. So you don’t know what was in the box?

 

A. No all I know is he was playing with one of the Zippy Boxes and I said is that the same thing Barry saw and you said yes well then obviously I’ve seen it, put it together to whatever it was, so whatever he was putting together in a Zippy Box I saw him playing with it ...".

(p.2)

 

When he gave evidence, Martin retreated from that position, denying that he saw Chamberlain "working" on the Zippy Box, or that he was making the bomb, or that he was putting something together in the Zippy Box (T.1326).

10.32 I formed a distinctly unfavourable impression of Martin when he was back-tracking about what he saw Chamberlain doing. It must also be said that Martin has admitted giving misleading evidence on another topic and so his credibility as a witness is not good. It is not possible for me to draw a conclusion as to where the truth lies about this instance. Chamberlain denied that he ever purchased a Zippy Box (T.2505). The evidence of Geoffrey Snook supports Martin’s contention that Chamberlain had Zippy Boxes, although he said they were white (T.3070). I do not think that Snook’s evidence takes the matter much further.

10.33 It is possible that Sunk has deliberately exaggerated what Martin has told him in order to get Chamberlain into trouble and thereby help Perre, or Martin may have exaggerated what he saw in order to ingratiate himself with Sunk, or for some other reason, and is now seeking to retreat from that position. I formed an unfavourable impression of both witnesses, and suspect that they both set out, at least initially, to help Perre’s cause by falsely implicating Chamberlain.

10.34 Did Chamberlain have a motive?

It is very difficult in a case such as this to adequately assess the question of what motive a person may have had to commit such a heinous crime. It is easy to conclude that no rational person would have done so. However, there can be rational explanations for such behaviour, evil as it is. For example, the acts of terrorists are rational in the sense that they can be motivated by politics, or greed, or revenge. It may be that whoever sent the bomb which killed Sergeant Bowen also had such an objective in mind. It is too easy to dismiss such behaviour as irrational.

10.35 It was alleged by Frank Carbone that Chamberlain was offering Perre’s guns for sale, and that he wanted to set up Perre for the bombing in order to render him powerless to do anything about it. When cross-examined by Mr. Rice, counsel for the NCA, he said:-

"Q. So you were postulating that Chamberlain may have, if he was the bomber, as it were, saw this as a business opportunity, to send this bomb, have it detected and then the line of business that he was in would flourish.

A. That is basically it yes.

Q. Is that the only motive you ascribe to Chamberlain as a result of your work?

 

A. In relation to his motive.

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. What other motive do you suggest he had.

A. At the time, Mr. Chamberlain had a large amount of firearms in his possession. On the black market, they would be worth a lot of money. Mr. Chamberlain was struggling financially. If he was able to sell those firearms without any repercussions, he would obviously get himself out of the financial predicament that he was in and hopefully move on.

 

Q. What does that have to do with sending the bomb?

A. If Mr. Chamberlain is to sell the firearms, he has to eliminate, if I can use that term, the person who he believes those firearms belong to.

 

 

Q. Oh, I see. They are Perre’s firearms. He sets up Perre and sells his firearms and Perre goes down for the bombing. Is that the way your mind was working?

 

A. Back at that time, yes".

(T.2246)

10.36 There is some evidence that Chamberlain was offering Perre’s guns for sale. Stephen Sunk made that allegation (T.775), but I have severe reservations about his credibility, for reasons I have already outlined.

10.37 There is also evidence from David Hirst, the RAAF employee who supplied Chamberlain with the plastic cylinders in which he stored various items under his floor-boards. Hirst said that Chamberlain told him that "at some stage in the future" he would have firearms for sale, and in particular referred to a ‘PSG1 sniper rifle". Hirst said that he told Chamberlain that he was not interested in such a weapon (T.3329). There is no evidence that a PSG1 sniper rifle was among the weapons owned by Perre and stored by Chamberlain in any event.

10.38 In my opinion, there is no evidence to support Carbone’s theories, which seem to owe more to a fertile imagination than they do to real evidence.

10.39 Allegations of Maroudas

Maroudas alleged that Chamberlain made a number of quite outlandish statements which indicated his hatred of the NCA. He said:-

"Q. Can you tell us what those discussions were about, what they involved.

A. Just about everything from hating the NCA for some reason, hating the NCA, to sending them a parcel bomb. He was pretty frustrated with them.

 

...

 

Q. Why did he say he was frustrated with the NCA?

A. Something to do with his drink-driving or something. I really can’t recall. He just didn’t like them at all. He had a real hate of them".

(T.910-911).

Maroudas also told Frank Carbone in an interview on 31 October 1994 (Exhibit C.114d) that Chamberlain told him:-

"I’d love to be on a, on top of the building as well, mention, on top of the building with a night vision, with a rifle with a night vision gear and he’d just pin-point people from down the street and blow them away ...".

(p.5)

10.40 Maroudas had been interviewed by the police on 11 May 1994 (Exhibit C.114), but he did not make any of these allegations at that time. The first time these allegations arose was in his conversation with Carbone on 31 October 1994 that I have just mentioned. When he spoke to the police, at Carbone’s suggestion, the following day, the allegations were not quite the same. They were that Chamberlain had said to him:-

"I would love to fucking blow the NCA up, the NCA building up. Fucking all a bunch of fucking pricks, pigs and this and that and that’s how I came, I just told him".

(Exhibit C.114a, p10).

Maroudas explained that he didn’t tell the police initially because "I didn’t want to get involved" (T.918).

10.41 Maroudas alleged that Chamberlain made these outlandish statements in the Central Firearms premises, when Karras was talking over the counter to Stan Tettis, and he was talking to Chamberlain. He said that Arthur and Stan were only about a metre away when "Gadget was saying all these things" (T.920).

10.42 It is therefore surprising that neither Karras nor Stan Tettis corroborated Maroudas’ allegations about what Chamberlain said. Chamberlain specifically denied making any such statements (T.2526). Chamberlain pointed out that he had never had any dealings with the NCA, or indeed any Federal agencies, either in relation to his business or in any other way (T.2562). Maroudas’ explanation that Chamberlain hated the NCA because of a drink-driving offence is plainly ludicrous. It flies in the face of the evidence of all the other people who knew Chamberlain better than Maroudas did, and who said that Chamberlain had never expressed ill-will towards any police officer, and, indeed, spent much of his time trying to ingratiate himself with them so he could further his business interests (see the evidence of Kira T.663).

10.43 I formed a very unfavourable impression of Maroudas’ credibility as a witness. His demeanour indicated to me that he was being deliberately untruthful on a number of occasions, particularly when questioned on matters of detail about his allegations (for example whether or not he accompanied Karras into his bedroom when he collected the Cordex - T.908).

10.44 I have deep suspicions about Maroudas’ role in all of this. His explanation as to why he did not tell the police of his allegations when they spoke to him in May 1994, and how he came to contact Frank Carbone, are inherently incredible. The allegations first surfaced via Frank Carbone in his interview with Karras on 31 October 1994. When cross-examined on matters of detail, Maroudas was evasive and, I thought, deliberately vague.

10.45 No motive has been proven as to why Maroudas would come forward and give evidence against Chamberlain in the way he has. There is a suggestion in the statement of John Harold Martin, given to police on 13 June 1995, that he was approached by a man named Tamboureas in the Adelaide Remand Centre, and asked to give a statement exonerating Perre, and to find another person with a reasonably clear record to corroborate that evidence. When called to give evidence, Martin was clearly hostile, and asserted that he did not remember making such a statement to the police, and that if he did it was "probably not the truth" (T.1967). Tamboureas denied being asked by Perre or anyone on his behalf to find such a witness (T.1864). There is no evidence upon which I can conclude that Maroudas is such a witness.

10.46 Whatever Maroudas’ motivation, I find that he is without credibility, and I reject his evidence.

10.47 The reward

It was common knowledge that the Commissioner of Police had announced that Cabinet had approved the payment of a reward of up to $500,000 for information leading to the conviction of the perpetrators of this crime. This was approved on 7 March 1994. Tettis told me that Chamberlain had said to him:-

"If I get this reward I may need your real estate experience to help me invest some of the funds".

(T.1519).

He also made comments to both Kira and Carbone which indicated that he was conscious of the fact that a reward had been offered. Chamberlain admitted that he was aware that there was a large reward being offered (T.2524), but I do not consider that he has been motivated to concoct this story to collect the reward. It should be remembered that in his early interviews with police, he said that he thought that Perre was innocent (see Exhibit C.137a, p8).

10.48 Esoteric knowledge of the components of the NCA bomb

 

I have already mentioned that Chamberlain is a braggart who liked to demonstrate his knowledge of technical matters. For example, Marijan Kira gave evidence that he had said to Chamberlain on one occasion that it was unfortunate for Bowen that the X-ray equipment was not working, and that anybody would be an "idiot" knowing such precautions were in place, to try and send such a bomb. He said:-

"Mr. Chamberlain immediately became very defensive and proceeded to - I perceive that now as ‘big-noting’ his knowledge, in saying ‘anybody who knows what they’re doing could get a bomb through that sort of equipment without any problem’, and he went on to describe how, by using flat - I think flat batteries were mentioned, ... and how disguising a bomb to look as if it was a gift would fool any X-ray equipment and allow that sort of equipment, that sort of stuff to pass through as a seemingly innocent parcel".

(T.659-60).

10.49 Although Chamberlain had extensive knowledge of how bombs can be constructed, he was wrong on several counts in his speculations to Kira (I have omitted several other technical details mentioned by Chamberlain on the basis that I do not consider it helpful that they become public knowledge).

10.50 Chamberlain engaged in similar speculation during several of his conversations with Frank Carbone on the telephone (see for example Exhibit C.135y, commencing at p.9).

10.51 Carbone asserted that Chamberlain was aware, without prompting, that red phosphorus had been used in the NCA bomb. This is contrary to the evidence of Kira where Chamberlain speculated that the bomb contained Potassium chloride, which burns (T.660). Carbone insisted that it was Chamberlain who brought up the topic of red phosphorus (T.2409). When cross-examined by Mr. Caldicott, Chamberlain insisted that he was "essentially posing hypotheticals" (T.2780). In my opinion, the context of those conversations with Carbone makes this obvious. Chamberlain was trying to work out what the bomb was composed of, using the general knowledge he already had, and that which he had gleaned from reading the newspapers and watching television. There is no evidence before me from which it could be reasonably concluded that Chamberlain had esoteric knowledge of the construction or contents of the NCA bomb.

10.52 There is also an allegation from Maroudas that Chamberlain told him that phosphorus was used in the bomb. In a conversation with Carbone on 31 October 1994 (Exhibit C.114d) Maroudas alleged that Chamberlain told him that phosphorus could be used to make a bomb. When asked by Carbone what colour, Maroudas said "red, maybe, I think it could have been red" (p.8). Chamberlain admits that he may have spoken to Maroudas about phosphorus, saying he may have done so in the context of a discussion about a shotgun shell called "Dragon’s Breath" from America that turns a shotgun into a mini flame-thrower. He said there were three such shells in the guns and ammunition he received from Perre (T.2870).

10.53 Frank Carbone

I have already mentioned that Frank Carbone, the private investigator retained by Perre’s lawyer to assist in the preparation of his defence, had a number of telephone conversations with Chamberlain after Perre was charged with murder. Carbone said that the first couple of telephone conversations he had with Chamberlain were not recorded, although he made notes of them. In one telephone conversation, which he said occurred before 21 April 1994, Carbone alleged that Chamberlain threatened his life and the lives of his family (T.2247). Carbone said that he made notes of this conversation but that he is unable to find them. At no stage did Carbone report the threat to the police. Clearly, Carbone was anxious for Chamberlain to continue telephoning him. The amiable nature of his later conversations with Chamberlain, which were recorded, indicate to me that either Carbone’s allegations about death threats are untrue, or if they are true that Carbone did not take them seriously. Clearly, Chamberlain was not aware that these later conversations were recorded, yet at no stage were the threats repeated. In all these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the threats were made.

10.54 Chamberlain insisted that he was unaware that Carbone was acting for Perre. He seemed to be under the impression that Carbone was conducting an unbiased investigation into the NCA explosion for some reason of his own (T.2552). He conceded that in retrospect it is easy to see what Carbone’s agenda was.

10.55 Chamberlain had previously developed a listening device for Carbone, which he used in the context of a commercial dispute (T.2529). As a result of that transaction, Chamberlain appears to have thought that they had a good personal relationship, and his telephone conversations with Carbone after Perre’s arrest were clearly conducted on that basis. Indeed, Chamberlain said that he was shocked when he found out later that Carbone was recording these conversations and regarded it as a breach of confidentiality (T.2534).

10.56 At one stage, Carbone attempted to use the transcripts of these conversations to bargain with the police. For example, at a meeting at an Adelaide restaurant, Carbone suggested that, in return for dropping all the charges against Perre, they would supply evidence which implicated Chamberlain. Swan was given a limited opportunity to inspect some of the transcripts (there was a total of about eleven hours). Carbone would not let them take a copy. This led to the issue of a search warrant to seize the transcripts, which was ultimately unsuccessful in the Federal Court (T.3655).

10.57 After having heard the tapes and read the transcripts for the first time during the course of the inquest, detectives formed the view that they were not helpful to the inquiry at all. Swan said:-

"I have certainly read through the eleven hours of conversation. My opinion of them, I think, is supported by the rest of the - the investigation team. It is of a person that - a very lonely person ... He appears to be lonely and he is answering leading questions by Mr. Carbone, and he is giving joking responses. There was nothing, in my opinion, in those eleven hours of conversation that impacted on our inquiry at all".

(T.3656)

10.58 Carbone also alleged that in late March 1994, he took possession of a number of documents from the Central Firearms shop and placed them in a lever-arch folder (Exhibit C.135a). Included in those papers was a photocopy of the Ace Chemical Company catalogue found at Domenic Perre’s house when it was searched on 2 March 1994, the evening of the bombing. The photocopy found at Central Firearms bore the same markings as the original.

10.59 What is somewhat mystifying about this event is that Central Firearms was searched by police, under the supervision of Detective Senior Sergeant Standing, on 7 March 1994 and none of these items were found. Detective Standing said that had he found the Ace Chemical Company document that day he would have seized it, as anything to do with explosives, and anything to do with chemicals would have been seized (T.3028-9). The same comments apply to photocopied "Safety Data Sheets" in relation to various chemical substances which were also taken by Carbone.

10.60 Chamberlain admitted that he had the photocopy of the Ace Chemical Company catalogue, believing that it came with the copy of the Palladin Press catalogue (Palladin Press was the publisher of the magazines I have discussed earlier), which he obtained from Perre. Chamberlain said that he did not make the marks on the catalogue (T.2555). As to the safety data sheets, Chamberlain explained that the chemicals involved there were the constituents of "mace", the substance he was seeking to sell to the Department for Correctional Services (T.2556).

10.61 Chamberlain’s movements during the week before 2 March 1994

It was suggested by Mr. Caldicott that there was something suspicious about the fact that Chamberlain could not account for his movements during the week before 2 March 1994, and in particular on 1 March 1994 when he alleges that he received the detonators, Cordex and magazines from Perre, and on the morning of 2 March 1994, at around the time the bomb exploded.

10.62 At the committal proceedings, Andrew Martin alleged that Allan Chamberlain was not present at Central Firearms during the entire week of the bombing until Thursday night 3 March 1994, when Chamberlain, Kira and Marshall went to dinner (see p.379 of the transcript). This was repeated in a statement Martin gave to police on 3 August 1994, the day Perre was committed for trial.

10.63 Martin was later charged with perjury arising out of that evidence, since it was established that he was working a "swing shift" at Yatala Labour Prison (where he worked as a correctional officer) during the relevant period. He was acquitted of the charge. The swing shift was between 12.00 noon and 9.30p.m., although at his trial Martin argued that he attended at the shop during a "crib break". He is unable to justify his statement that Chamberlain was not at the shop. All of the other witnesses who were present at the shop that week (Tettis, Snook, etc.) were unable to say whether Chamberlain was there at any particular stage or not.

10.64 As to the morning of 2 March 1994, Chamberlain told the police that he left home at about 10 past 9, walked to a bus stop, caught the bus at 9.20a.m., arriving in the city at about 10.05 or 10.10a.m.. He said he could not have left home until after 9 o’clock, as he had to wait until the bank opened so he could telephone to make sure that funds were in the account (T.2773). He was able to produce a receipt from the bank which is timed at 11.27a.m. He was unable to account for his movements between 10.00a.m. and 11.20a.m. (T.2773). He said that he heard sirens going down King William Street and assumed they were going to Waymouth Street (T.2774). Whether there were still vehicles with sirens travelling down King William Street to Waymouth Street at that time of the morning is not clear. Alternatively, it is possible that the sirens related to a different incident altogether. I am unable to draw any inference adverse to Chamberlain arising out of these discrepancies.

10.65 Robert Eagles alleged to police that he was driving down Waymouth Street looking for a car park on the morning of the explosion, and that he saw Allan Chamberlain standing in Waymouth Street in the general area of the CPS Credit Union building at around the time of the explosion. It is clear from his statement to police (Exhibit C.162a), given on 30 July 1994, that Eagles purported to positively identify Chamberlain. He said:-

"I am positive that it was Allan Chamberlain I saw in the street, and (he) was no more than ten feet away from him when I drove past him twice. I was hoping to have been able to speak to him or catch his eye as I drove past him, to get directions and speak to him".

(p.3)

10.66 When he gave evidence, however, Eagles retreated from that position, saying that he had been informed by police that they had photographs from the scene, and that there was a man in the photograph who looked like Chamberlain but who was not him. He said:-

"At the time, I was reasonably positive. At the time, I was also informed that the police had a photo - photographs, footage of people that were there, and there was a guy in the crowd there that looked very similar to Allan Chamberlain, but in fact it wasn’t Allan Chamberlain. So working from being told that, I am presuming that it was the same guy that I saw that I thought was Chamberlain".

(T.1816).

10.67 Chamberlain denied that he went into Waymouth Street at all that day (T.2509). It is difficult to know what to make of Eagles’ evidence about this. He did not ever see the photograph which allegedly depicted this man in the street, and yet he has withdrawn his allegation merely on the strength of an intimation by a police officer that they had such a photograph. Having regard to my earlier comment about Eagles’ credibility, it is difficult to know whether to put his evidence down to an honest change of heart, or whether there has been a deliberate attempt to discredit Chamberlain by putting him at the scene of the explosion, thereby implying that he had prior knowledge that it was about to occur.

10.68 There is evidence that Chamberlain had returned to Central Firearms by about 11.30a.m. The statements of Andrew Oakes (Exhibit C.88a) and Leanne Woolman (Exhibit C.89a) establish that Chamberlain was serving in the shop at around that time. These are two further items of evidence which contradict the evidence of Martin that Chamberlain was not in the shop at all that week until the Thursday evening.

10.69 In all the circumstances, notwithstanding Mr. Caldicott’s submissions to the contrary, I find that there is no reason to doubt Chamberlain’s evidence about his movements during the week prior to 2 March 1994, or about his movements that morning.

 

10.70 Conclusion

There is no evidence to justify a conclusion that Allan Chamberlain played any part in either the construction of, or the sending of the bomb to Sergeant Bowen at the NCA. Chamberlain has given lengthy statements to the police, he has had lengthy telephone conversations with Frank Carbone, some of which have been recorded without his knowledge, and he gave detailed evidence in court and was cross-examined at length by Mr. Caldicott, counsel for Perre. Having regard to the totality of that evidence, which has not been contradicted by Perre, there is nothing upon which I could draw the conclusion that Chamberlain was involved. Perre’s refusal to give evidence in support of a number of allegations made by Mr. Caldicott in cross-examination should not be regarded as evidence to the contrary of the allegations. However, it is clear that I am entitled to more readily accept the evidence of Chamberlain in view of that fact. In Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 227 the High Court (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ) said:-

"It has never really been doubted that when a party to litigation fails to accept an opportunity to place before the court evidence of facts within his or her knowledge which, if they existed or, would explain or contradict the evidence against that party, the court may more readily accept that evidence. It is not just because uncontradicted evidence is easier or safer to accept than contradicted evidence. That is almost a truism. It is because doubts about the reliability of witnesses or about the inferences to be drawn from the evidence may be more readily discounted in the absence of contradictory evidence from a party who might be expected to give or call it".

 

 

11. Findings

11.1 Having regard to my conclusions about Allan Chamberlain, and accepting the truthfulness of his evidence, as I have done, in my opinion the primary suspicion must be that Domenic Perre was responsible for the sending of the bomb to Sergeant Bowen at the NCA office in early March 1994. In summary, the evidence which points in this direction is as follows:-

• Perre’s awareness of the prominent role taken by Bowen in the search of Perre’s premises on 6 September 1993, at a time when Perre’s wife was expecting a baby, and his mother was dying of cancer;

 

• Perre’s apparent indignation at being arrested on 13 September 1993 by Bowen;

 

• Bowen’s provocative behaviour towards Perre at the Adelaide Police Station after the arrest;

 

• the fact that Perre’s case was listed for trial the day after the bomb exploded;

 

• Perre’s false statement to Presgrave on 2 March 1994 that he did not know the identity of the person responsible for bringing the charges against him, when he was clearly aware that it was Bowen;

 

• the threat to "waste" Superintendent Young during the course of the Hidden Valley inquiry (which I consider can be regarded as evidence of Perre’s general attitude to those who create difficulties for him);

 

• Perre’s possession of illegal magazines which, when taken in combination, provided sufficient information and instruction on how to built the type of bomb which exploded on 2 March 1994;

 

• Chamberlain’s information to the police;

 

• Perre’s actions in hiding his weapons collection for safe-keeping, together with the Palladin Press magazines, asking for the return of several of the magazines dealing with explosives several weeks later, and then returning them to Chamberlain on 1 March 1994 together with detonators and other things;

 

• Perre’s admissions to Chamberlain about the manufacture and testing of bombs;

 

• the identification of Perre by staff of Dick Smith Electronics as a regular customer who made inquiries on one occasion about Zippy Boxes and micro-switches;

 

• Perre’s possession of the Ace Chemical Company catalogue in which two of the three ingredients for "Home Made C-4" are marked, along with other chemicals which can be used to make explosives, and his identification by staff of that company as a regular customer;

 

• Perre’s actions in hiding his briefcase containing passports, bank books and other important personal papers with Battiste on the day of the bombing;

 

• Perre’s action in writing the letter to Tettis asking him to falsely implicate Chamberlain;

 

• Perre’s statement to undercover officers Pahia and Anderson that he had a detailed knowledge of chemicals, and red phosphorus in particular, and that it could be purchased from Ace Chemicals;

 

• Perre’s mouthing the word "bomb" when explaining why he could not buy the red phosphorus himself;

 

• Perre’s statements to Anderson and Pahia that the police were looking in the wrong place;

 

• Perre’s description of Detective Sergeant Bowen as a "piece of shit";

 

• Perre’s statements to Anderson and Pahia that he was upset about his house being "trashed", that he wished he had "taken out the whole fucking building", and that he "dreamed about" the bomb.

 

11.2 I have given anxious consideration to the finding I should make in view of this evidence. I have paid close regard to the standard of proof required to make a finding in these circumstances, as described in Briginshaw and G v H (supra). I am particularly aware that some of the evidence before me might not be admissible in a criminal court. Some unfairness or illegality, which has not been ventilated in my court, may affect its admissibility. I can do nothing about that. The evidence is before me, and I have been as rigorous and selective in my consideration of it as the circumstances would allow.

11.3 In the final analysis, however, the evidence, and the inferences that may be drawn from it, have not been answered by Mr. Perre. In those circumstances, the words of the High Court in Weissensteiner (supra) bear repeating:-

"It is because doubts about the reliability of witnesses, or about references to be drawn from the evidence may be more readily discounted in the absence of contradictory evidence from a party who might be expected to give or call it".

 

11.4 In my opinion, however, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that Dominic Perre was responsible, in the sense that he constructed the bomb, and either posted it or arranged for someone else to post it on his behalf to Detective Sergeant Bowen.

11.5 From all the evidence, I am unable to find whether Perre acted alone or in concert with another person or persons.

 

11.6 Accordingly, I find, pursuant to Section 25(1) of the Coroners Act (1975), that the circumstances of the death of Detective Sergeant Geoffrey Leigh Bowen were that he died when he opened a parcel bomb, sent to him by Domenic Perre, and the bomb exploded in his hands.

 

 

 

 

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